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Summary findings
DeRosa reviews the static theory of regional integration  Yet few if any extant customs unions or free trade
arrangements, identifying and analyzing the impact of  areas meet such simple guidelines fully.
such arrangements on the trade and welfare of member  To some extent, customs unions and free trade areas
countries,nonmember  countries, and the world at large.  are expected to result in cessation of trade (in
He develops eight policy guidelines that apply mainly  homogeneous goods) with nonmember countries. Where
to small trading  countries unable to influence their  trade between member countries and nonmember
international terms of trade or to cease trading entirely  countries is expected to continue under regional
with nonmember countries, assuming increasing cost  arrangements (as real-world data suggest), internationally
conditions in member countries, homogeneous traded  determined terms of trade rather than regionally
goods, and perfect competition.  determined terms of trade are likely to prevail within the
The guidelines advise establishing regional facilities for  trading bloc, limiting the welfare-improving effects of
compensatory lump-sum transfers or other intrabloc  creating trade but not the welfare-reducing effects of
payments to avoid the possibility that, where a trading  trade diversion.
bloc would be welfare-improving overall, the bloc would  Among the most interesting and arguably
not be formed because of the (justified) recalcitrance of  "operational"  policy guidelines to emerge from DeRosa's
one or more would-be member countries whose  analysis a:re  those concerning countries that might choose
economic welfare might be reduced by the adoption  of  to join (1) a large rather than small regional trading bloc,
the regional trade arrangement.  (2) a regional integration  arrangement to overcome
Other guidelines are appropriate  on commonsense  hindrances facing exports to third countries, or (3) a
grounds. For example: Regional trade arrangements will  regional integration arrangement that could have strong
be welfare-improving if they are formed by countries that  pro-competitive effects under imperfect competition and
are predominantly least-cost producers of exportables, or  increasing,  returns to scale. Guidelines 1 and 2 concern
if they give rise to increased imports from all trading  mostly developing countries; guideline 3 concerns mostly
partners.  advanced countries. But the economic bases for the three
guidelines are relevant and compelling.
This paper-a  product of Trade, Development Research Group-is  a background paper prepared for a World Bank Policy
Research Report, Regionalism  and Development. Copies of the paper are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street
NW, Washington, DC 20433.  Please contact Lili Tabada, room MC3-333,  telephone 202-473-6896,  fax 202-522-1159,
Internet  address ltabada@worldbank.org.  November 1998. (118 pages)
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of  work in progress to  encourage the exchange of  ideas about
development issues.  An objective of the series  is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The
papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this
paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the view of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the
countries  they represent.
Produced  by the  Policy Research  Disseinination  CenterRegional Integration Arrangements: Static Economic Theory,
Quantitative Findings, and Policy Guidelines
Dean A. DeRosa
ADR International, Ltd.
200 Park Avenue, Suite 202
Falls Church, Virginia 22046  U. S.A.
Tel/Fax: 703 532-8510
E-Mail: ADRintl@compuserve.corm
Background  paper  for  a  World  Bank  Policy  Research  Report  entitled  Regionalism  and
Development,  prepared under  short-term contract for the  InLernational Trade  Division of  the
World Bank. The author is Principal Economist of ADR International, Ltd., an economic research
and policy consulting firm.Summarv
Regional  integration  arrangements have  been  the  subject  of  considerable  economic
analysis, beginning with seminal contributions to the "customs union issue" by Viner (1950) and
Meade  (1955).  Today, both  theoretical  work  and  quantitative work  on  regional  integration
arrangements have been newly inspired by the current resurgence of regionalism and the issues it
poses  for  both  advanced  countries  and  less  developed  countries,  and  for  the  international
community of nations which is concerned for continued progress in international development and
the global trading system.
This paper reviews the static theory of regional integration arrangements and considers the
relevant findings of  recent  quantitative studies  of  new  and  "revitalized" regional  integration
arrangements, identifying and analyzing, as possible, the expeclted or actual impacts of regional
integration agreements on trade and welfare of member countries, non-member countries, and the
world  at  large.  The  paper  also  derives a  limited number  of policy  guidelines for  advanced
countries and less developed countries considering joining either large or small regional trading
blocs.
The impacts of regionalism and discriminatory trade policies in static economic theory are
frequently  dependent  upon  the  circumstances  surrounding  individual  regional  integration
arrangements and member countries, consistent with the theory of second-best in which seeming
movements  in  the  direction  of  Pareto-optimality  are  not  adways welfare-improving.  Thus,
beginning  with  Viner's  early  conclusion  that  regional  integration  arrangements  might  be
predominantly  trade-diverting  and  therefore  welfare-reducing, the  static  theory  of  regional
integration arrangements has mainly failed to  yield universally applicable guidelines for policy
making.
The paper derives eight policy guidelines from the  staLtic  theory of regional integration
arrangements. The policy guidelines are applicable mainly to  small trading countries unable to
influence their international terms of trade or to cease trading entirely with non-member countries,
under the  assumptions of increasing cost conditions in member countries, homogenous  traded
goods, and  perfect  competition. The policy guidelines apply appropriately to  many advanced
countries and most  less developed countries whose combined trade  accotnts  for only a  small
fraction of world trade.
The  policy  guidelines  indicate  the  advisability of  establishing  regional  facilities for
compensatory lump-sum transfers or other intra-bloc payments to avoid the possibility that, where
a trading bloc would  be  welfare-improving in the  aggregate, the  bloc would  not  be  formed
because  of  the  (justified) recalcitrance  of  one  or  more  would-be  member  countries  whose
economic welfare might be  reduced by the adoption of the  regional integration arrangement.Other  policy  guidelines are  appropriate  on  common-sense if  not  tautological  grounds.  For
instance, that regional integration arrangements will be welfare-improving if they are formed by
countries that  are  predominantly least-cost  producers  of  exportables  or  if  they  give rise  to
increased imports from all trading partners are reasonable policy guidelines in simplest economic
terms. Yet, few if any extant customs unions or free trade areas meet such simple guidelines fully.
A subtly important aspect of the policy guidelines and underlying static theory of regional
integration arrangements is the extent to which customs unions and free trade areas are expected
to result in cessation of trade (in homogenous goods) with non-member countries. Where trade
between member countries and non-member countries is expected to  continue under a regional
integration arrangement (as suggested by real world data), internationally determined terms of
trade rather than regionally determined terms of trade are likely to prevail within the trading bloc,
limiting welfare-improving trade creation effects but not welfare-reducing trade diversion effects.
This is readily apparent in the Vinerian model, and is likely to be relevant to similar outcomes in
the Meade model that are not treated extensively  in the economic literature.
Among the most interesting and arguably "operational" policy guidelines to  emerge from
the  analysis of the paper  are those concerning countries that  mnight  choose to join (1) a  large
rather  than  small regional  trading bloc,  (2)  a regional  integration  arrangement to  overcome
hindrances facing exports to third-countries, or (3) a regional integration arrangement that could
have strong pro-competitive effects under imperfect competition and increasing returns to scale.
The first two policy guidelines confront mainly less developed countries, while the third policy
guideline  confronts  mainly  advanced  countries.  Quantitative  support  for  the  three  policy
guidelines is rather "thin,"' and quantitative support for the third policy guideline is particularly
subject to further theoretical and methodological refinement. Nonetheless, the economic bases for
the three policy guidelines are among the most relevant and compelling presented in the paper.
With regard to the body of quantitative "evidence" on regional integration arrangements,
few ex post  (empirical) quantitative studies or  ex ante (analytical) quantitative studies directly
investigate policy guidelines per se. Presumably owing to the exigencies of the theory of second
best,  both  ex  post  and  ex  ante  quantitative studies have  mainly investigated the  effects  of
regionalism on net trade creation and economic welfare on a  "one-off'  or case-by-case basis,
neglecting more direct or systematic analysis of the limited number of general propositions that
emerge from the static theory of regional integration arrangements.
Increasingly wide use of CGE models and other analytical models of regional integration
arrangements has raised critical questions about the appropriate specification and functional form
of key behavioral and technical relationships in these models. In particular, different assumptions
regarding the  extent  of firm-level economies of  scale and  different specifications of  demand
systems for  differentiated traded  goods  (rather  than  homogeneous  traded  goods  favored  in
neoclassical trade theory) can matter importantly for the magnitude of trade and welfare impacts
simulated by  analytical models.  Thus,  ex  ante  studies  employing  CGE  models  need  to  be
confronted more  frequently by  real world  data in  the  process  of  their  construction  and  the
evaluation of their simulation results.Nonetheless, the paper concludes that CGE and other analytical models are among the
most important tools that both applied economists and economic theoreticians today bring to the
problem of deriving useful policy guidelines on regional integration arrangements. This conclusion
applies particularly to deriving policy guidelines from the so-called large union Meade model - the
theoretical model that comes closest to encompassing the circumstances of the emerging "global
economy" in which extensive if not pervasive regionalism  might be expected to have appreciable-
to-significant spillover and feedback effects on international trade and welfare.Contents
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Amid strong centripetal forces forging closer economic relations among countries today,
regionalism has emerged  as a  force potentially rivaling multilateralism with, as yet,  uncertain
implications for the world trading system and the process of globalization itself  The European
Union (EU) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (Nafta) among Canada, Mexico, and
the United States are the two most prominent regional integration arrangements. However, well
over 50 regional integration and trading arrangements are currently in force around the world,
with  the vast  number of these  arrangements involving mainly less developed countries  (IMF
1994).
Both regionalism and multilateralism might be expected to result inl  economic integration
of neighboring countries. However, economic integration, which is defined here broadly as the
equalization of relative prices for traded goods among countries, need not be the same in both
cases because of the fundamental gulf between multilateralism's reliance on non-discriminatory
trade  policies and regionalism's reliance on  discriminatory trade  policies. During the  last half
century, multilateralism has been pursued through multilateral trade negotiations based  on the
most-favored-nation  (MFN) principle underlying the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GYATT)  and  its  successor,  the  World  Trade  Organization (WTO),  and  it  has  been  widely
regarded as the most appropriate path to  achieving the "first-best" outcome of world economic
integration. However, since the late-1980s and frustrations growing out of the protracted length
of the Uruguay Round negotiations concluded in 1994, regionalism has come to  be regarded in
many quarters as a "stepping stone" (rather than "stumbling  block") to achieving world economic2
integration, albeit by a more circuitous path involving, from an international political economy
perspective, potential competition if not conflict with  multilateralism as  a means of achieving
wider trade liberalization in the world economy.'
Bilateralism and regionalism have a longer history than multilateralism in modern history.
Regionalism dates to  the  19t" Century when,  in the  wake  of the  first  commercial treaty  to
incorporate an unconditional MFN clause, the Cobden (Anglo-French) Treaty of 1860, a number
of small European  states that had established customs unions among themselves also sought to
form trading alliances with France featuring the same MFN clause negotiated by France with
Britain. Notably in this case, regionalism contributed to the spread of lower trade barriers in much
of Western Europe as bilateral trade agreements based on the MVFN  principle multiplied in number
during the late-1800s. 2
Regional  integration  arrangements  have  been  the  subject  of  considerable  economic
analysis, beginning with the seminal contributions to the "customs union issue" by Viner (1950)
and  Meade  (1955).  Decisions  facing  both  advanced  and  less  developed  countries  about
participation  in  and  design  of  regional  integration  arrangements  have  newly  inspired  both
theoretical work  and  quantitative work  on regional integration arrangements. More  generally,
needs  of  the  international community for  better  understanding and  insight to  the  actual  or
potential effects of regionalism on the global trading system and emerging new global economy
have also spurred new work on regional integration arrangements.
' See,  Lawrence  (1991),  Summers  (1991),  and Bhagwati  (1992).
2 The Cobden  Treaty  and subsequent  bilateral  trading  arrangements  between  France,  on the one hand, and the
Zollverein  states and other small European  states,  on the other hand, resulted  in an effective  multilateral
arrangement,  ushering  in an unprecedented  era of liberal  trade  in Europe  that lasted  until  the 1914,  as discussed
recently  by Irwin (1993). Although  bilateral and regional  trading arrangements  played  an integral role, the liberal
outcome  for trade stemmed  from the widespread  adoption  of the MFN principle  and, arguably,  the "domino  effect"
of smaller states falling in line with the more  liberal  trade policies  of Britain and France.3
This paper reviews the static theory of regional integration arrangements and considers the
relevant findings of recent quantitative studies of regional integration arrangements, identifying, as
possible, the expected impacts of regional integration agreements on member countries and the
world at large. In addition, this paper attempts to  derive policy guidelines concerning regional
integration arrangements for national economic decision makers and their advisors.
The remainder of the paper is divided into five sections. Section 2 considers the  "first
principles"  of  regional  integration  arrangements  as  promulgated  by  Viner  (1950)  and  the
subsequent development of a partial equilibrium  framework that has come to be closely associated
with his name. Section 3 takes up the modern static theory of regional integration arrangements
which  is  based  on  more  models of  international trade  that  allow for  greater  adjustment of
domestic and international terms of trade, and for more explicit and directly derived measures of
national economic welfare. Section 4 takes up a number of extensions and special cases of the
Vinerian and Meade models that  are important in their own right and  which have led to  the
development of  particularly  complex quantitative economic models.  Section  5  examines the
findings of recent quantitative studies of the impacts of regional integration arrangements which,
in the absence of definitive theoretical results, have come to  hold  considerable sway in recent
discussions and evaluations of regional trading arrangements. Finally, in the concluding section,
Section 6 utilizes the guidelines for policy making on regionalism identified in Sections 2-to-4 as a
focal point for summarizing the findings of the paper.
Before turning to the main analysis, it should be noted that the paper considers mainly the
two  most  common forms of regional integration arrangements: customs unions and free trade4
areas.3 In a free trade  area (FTA),  countries  enforce  discriminatory  trade  policies  by eliminating all
tariff  and  other  political  barriers  to  imports  that  originate  wholly  or  in  substantial  measure  (as
determined  by  so-called  rules  of origin)  within  the  trading  bloc.  A  customs  union  (CU),  on  the
other  hand,  is a free trade  area  in which  member  countries  also  adopt  a  common  set  of external
tariffs,  quantitative  restrictions,  and  other measures  to limit imports  from outside  of the free trade
area.4 Notwithstanding  the  considerable  analytical  challenges  posed  by  customs  unions  and  free
trade  areas,  economic  analysis  of  higher  orders  of  economic  integration  poses  still  more
formidable  challenges.5 Accordingly,  in  considering  the  static  economic  theory  and  findings  of
recent  quantitative  studies  of regional  integration  arrangements,  this  paper  deals  principally  with
the two primary  forms  of regional  integration  arrangements  treated  in the economic  literature.
3  In addition to free trade  in goods (and services), regional economic integration can involve unrestricted
movement of  labor,  capital, or  other productive primary resources; and  harmonization of  sectoial and
macroeconomic  policies, economic institutions, and  even civil and  constitutional laws between neighboring
countries. These dimensions of regional integration  arrangements  are usually considered  with reference  to four
(increasing)  degrees of economic  integration:  free (or preferential)  trading area, customs  union, common  market,
and economic  union.
4With  regard to the other two major institutional  forms of economic  integration  between  countries, a common
market is a customs union in  which unrestricted movement of labor and possibly other primary factors of
production  is permitted, and an economic  union is a common  market  in which fiscal, monetary, and other major
economic policies (e.g., industrial policies) are harmonized or  otherwise closely coordinated.  For further
discussion,  see for instance  Robson  (1987).
5  Despite  the complexity  of higher orders of regional integration,  some if not many policy and other conclusions
derived from considering only free trade areas and customs  unions might still be expected  to hold in regard to
cormmon  markets and economic  unions. For instance,  in neoclassical  economic  theory the mobility  of labor and
other primary resources  between  countries  can be viewed  as a perfect  substitute  for the unrestricted movement  of
goods  between countries (Mundell 1957). Similarly,  the harmonization  of economywide  policies and especially
monetary  policies might be viewed  as providing  an "enabling  environment,"  reducing  concerns  for differences  in
national monetary  and other macroeconomic  policies  that are not usually  considered  in the pure (barter exchange)
theory of international  trade underlying  most analyses  of free trade areas and customs  unions (e.g., Mundell 1961
and O'Connell 1997).5
2.  "First Principles" of Regional Integration Arrangements
The literature on customs unions .... is a strange phenomenon which unites
free-traders  and  protectionists in  the  field of  commercial policy, and  its
strangeness  suggests  that  there  is  something  peculiar  in  the  apparent
economnics  of customs unions. The customs union problem is entangled in
the  whole free-trade-protection  issue, and it  has never yet been properly
disentangled.
Viner (1950, p.41)
So begins the celebrated contribution of Viner (1950) to the econormic  theory of regional
integration arrangements. In the quotation, Viner points to the fact that customs unions were a
feature of the international econornic landscape during (and, iII fact, long before) the early post-
World War II period, when the two Bretton Woods organizations - the International Monetary
Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) - were first
getting underway,  and a third international organization, the International Trade Organization,
was  waiting  ratification of  its  enabling  document,  the  Havana  Charter.  The  quotation  also
indicates that  regional  integration  arrangements had  been  investigated by  economists  before
Viner, but without resolution.
Today, nearly 50 years after the Havana Charter was rejected by the United States, the
World Trade Organization has been established, finally institutionalizing many of the principles
and basic functions that were originally envisioned for the International Trade Organization and
supported  only partially during the intervening years by the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade  and its  interim caretaker,  the GATT  Secretariat. Also today,  major aspects of  Viner's
seminal analysis of the customs union issue have endured, finding their way into most textbooks
on international trade theory and policy.6
The enduring Vinerian framework is a highly stylized one, and it bears review here for not
only its strengths but also its weaknesses. Viner's original investigation of the customs union issue
was devoid of modem-day diagrammatic and mathematical methods of analysis. In this respect,
Viner's analysis was "deficient," requiring later development of the "textbook" analysis that bears
his name today. Nonetheless, Viner's analysis was extremely rich in insights to  some important
circumstances still surrounding the customs  union issue today, including economies of  scale,
differentiated products,  imperfectly competition, and  changes in international terms of  trade. 6
Discussion of these circumstances is deferred mainly to subsequent sections of this paper. In the
present section, the basic Viner model is introduced and extended to the especially important case
of increasing costs of production in member countries, under the maintained assumption that only
homogeneous  goods  (i.e.,  non-differentiated products)  are  produced  and  consumed in  both
member countries and non-member countries.
Basic Viner Model7
The basic Viner model provides a partial equilibrium  framework for considering the effects
of customs unions. The framework consists of economic relationships depicting demand, supply,
6 Viner is duly  credited  with raising substantive  questions  about the welfare  effects  of customs  unions, which were
widely  believed  to be positive  following  World  War II (not unlike today).  However,  the rather strident tone of his
final rejection  of regional integration  arrangements  on mainly  political-economy  grounds,  found  in the concluding
paragraph  of his volume  on the customs  union issue,  is not often  reported:
.. [I]f one looks only to the day, an apparently  promising  path to a solution  can often be found
whose first stages, if token in character, are fairly easy to pursue and whose last stages are
pleasant to contemplate,  though  what is at its ultimate end is but a mirage. This, I fear, is the
present-day role of customs union....  [I]t will almost inevitably operate as a psychological
barrier to the realization  of the more desirable  but less desired  objectives  of the Havana  Charter-
the balanced  multilateral  reduction  of trade barriers  on a non-discriminatory  basis. (Viner 1950,
p. 139)
The discussion of the Vinerian framework here draws importantly on Robson (1987), Pomfret (1988), and
Bhagwati  and Panagariya  (1996).7
and trade in homogeneous goods (for final consumption) by three representative countries: the
home country (H), a partner member country (P), and a non-member country (N) representing the
rest of the world.
Most  important,  in  addition  to  a  number  of  "orthodox"  (but  not  inconsequential)
assumptions shared with the pure theory of international trade, 8 the basic Viner model assumes
that,  although  import-competing  goods  may be  produced  under  increasing  (marginal) cost
conditions, exportable goods  are produced under constant cost  conditions in each country. In
Figure 1, the non-member country is assumed to be the most efficient producer of good 1, which
is imported by the home country after levying a specific tariff, TH 1. Similarly,  the home country is
assumed to  be the most  efficient producer of good 2, which is imported by the partner country
after levying a specific tariff, Tp 2.
Under  a  customs  union  (or  free trade  area)  between  the  home  country  and  partner
country, 9 the home country reduces its tariff on imports of good  1 from the partner country to
8 As enumerated by Robson (1987), in addition to the homogeneous goods assumption, these assumptions include:
-- pure competition in commodity and factor markets;
--  mobility of factors of production within but not between countries;
--  no transportation costs;
--  trade restrictions only in the form of specific or ad valorem tariffs;
--  opportunity costs of production fully reflected in prices;
--  balanced trade in goods; and
--  full employment of resources.
9 Customs unions and  free trade  areas are assumed  mostly equivalent throughout  much  of the  analysis  of this
paper. As mentioned in the introduction, countries forming a free trade area eliminate tariffs and other restrictions
to intra-bloc trade, but they do not necessarily adopt a common external tariff system as do countries forming  a
customs union.  To avoid trade  "deflection," whereby exports by countries outside the free trade area to countries
that are members of the free trade area might be re-routed through member countries with lower-tariff levels, free
trade areas generally  enforce  "rules of origin"  that  stipulate the  extent  of intra-bloc  content  or processing  that
goods must  possess in  order to  qualify for duty-free importation by rmember countries. However,  as  noted by,
among others, Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996), rules of origin do not prohibit diversion of domestically produced
goods in countries forming a free trade area, in which case differing external tariff rates under a free trade area can
lead to little or substantially different results than under a customs unioii, depending upon the variance of external
tariff rates and capacity of member countries in a free trade area to divert their output of exportables from domestic
markets to markets in other member countries.8
zero,  providing  would-be  exporters  of  good  1  in  the  partner  country  with  a  "margin  of
preference" sufficient to  overcome their cost disadvantage vis-a-vis more efficient producers in
the non-member country.'° This causes exports from the partner country to  supplant exports of
good 1 from the non-member country to the home country entirely. The replacement of erstwhile
exports from efficient producers in non-member countries by exports from less efficient producers
in member countries is termed trade diversion. In Figure l(a), trade diversion resulting from the
regional integration arrangement is equal to the entire initial value of imports of good I (evaluated
at the border price PN')  by the home country from country N, area (k).  1
The customs union may also give rise to trade creation. Trade creation corresponds to the
expansion of home country imports of good  1 (evaluated at the border price Ppl) by the area
[(e+j) + (g+l)]. In economic terms, trade creation involves the substitution in both home country
production and home country consumption of lower-priced units of good  I produced by country
P than were previously available to the home country through domestic production [area (e+j)l or
imports from the rest of the world [area (g+l)].
In Figure 1(b), the hypothesized customs union has qualitatively different effects on trade
of the partner country. Because the home country is the least-cost producer of good 2, elimination
of the partner country's tariff on imports of good 2 from the home country results solely in trade
creation. No diversion of erstwhile exports from non-member countries occurs in connection with
the increase in imports by the partner country. Moreover,  the expansion of exports of good  2
from the home country to the partner country gives rise solely of substitution in production and
consumption in country P of lower-cost units of good 2 produced in the home country than were
'° With reference to Figure  1, the home country margin of preference in favor of exports of good 1 from the partner
country  is equal to TH  -(PP  -PN 1).
11  For ease  of exposition,  the analysis  here is conducted  in terms of trade values rather than trade volumes.9
available previously to the partner country through domestic production or imports from the non-
member country.
Since Viner's seminal analysis, trade creation and diversion have been treated as virtually
synonymous with the impact of customs unions and other regeional  integration arrangements on
economic welfare. Accordingly, many empirical and quantitative studies have sought to estimate
trade creation and diversion on either an ex ante (before the -Fact)  basis or ex post (afterwards)
basis. To the extent that a regional integration arrangement is trade creating on a net basis (i.e.,
measured trade creation is greater than measured trade diversion), the arrangement is considered
to contribute positively to the combined if not individual  welfare of member countries, measured
in  terms  of  traditional  economic  surpluses  (so-called  Harberger  triangles  of  consumer  and
producer  surpluses)  or  more  sophisticated  indices  of  economic  welfare  such  as  Hicksian
equivalent variation in income. 12
Table  1  provides  a  summary of  the  effects  on  trade  and  economic welfare  of  the
hypothetical customs union considered in Figure 1, for the home country, the partner country, and
the customs union formed by the two countries. The changes illustrate that net trade creation is
not  always unambiguous in sign, as emphasized by Viner (1950).  Whereas the customs union
results in net trade  creation for the  partner country in respect to  its imports  of good  2, the
customs union does not necessarily result in net trade creation for the home country in respect to
its imports of good  I  or for the custom union as a whole itn respect to  trade in both goods.13
These results are "rnirrored" in the changes in economic welfare for the two countries. Whereas
economic welfare improves unambiguously for the partner country owing to  the dominance of
12  See, for instance, Harberger (1954,  1971) on the measurement  of consumer and producer surplus and  Shoven
and Whalley (1984, 1992) on the measurement of Hicksian equivalent variation in inconme.
13 It is also notable that net trade creation is not necessarily equal to the change in import value for either country.10
positive consumption and production effects of trade creation, the change in economic welfare is
uncertain for  the home  country (and customs union)  because even though  the  combined net
consumption and production effects related to trade creation and diversion in the home country
[area (a + b +c) in Figure 1(a)] are positive, they might not be sufficiently  large in magnitude to be
greater than the forgone home country tariff revenues on imports diverted from the non-member
country to the partner country [area (b + f)].
These results, of course, follow from the assumptions depicted in Figure 1 regarding the
relative  efficiency of  producing  exportables in the  home country,  partner  country,  and  non-
member country. For the partner country, the customs union gives rise to trade creation only and
greater welfare because the home country is the (assumed) least cost producer of good 2. For the
home country, the welfare change is uncertain because the partner country is assumed to be less
efficient than the rest of the world in producing good 1. Thus, under assumed constant costs of
production, trade with non-member countries is completely diverted, giving rise to forgone tariff
revenues that rnight or might not be larger than the production-related and consumption-related
benefits to  the home country of a lower import price and increased imports from the partner
country. In effect, in a customs union under constant cost conditions, member country gains in
economic welfare attributable to  trade creation will be  partially offset,  if not  more than fully
offset, by added costs of importing goods from high-cost producing countries within the customs
union area and forgone tariff revenues. Obversely, in a customs union formed among countries
that  are  predominantly  internationally  competitive  producers  of  exportables,  the  regional11
integration  arrangement  will be  trade-creating  on  a  net  basis  and  unambiguously welfare-
improving. 
14
Quantitative studies of regional integration arrangements have found nearly universally,
beginning with ex post empirical studies of the European Commnunity  during the 1960s and 1970s
and continuing today with mostly ex ante quantitative studies of the many new and "revitalized"
free trade areas emerging since 1990, that regional trading blocs are predominantly trade-creating
on a net basis. Quantitative "evidence" on welfare gains under regional integration arrangements
has  traditionally been more  sporadic, except in recent  years with  the advent  of  sophisticated
computable general equilibrium (CGE) models employed in ex ante studies of regional integration
arrangements. An early ex post study of trade in maliufactures and agriculture under the European
Community by Balassa (1975)  found that  formation of  the  European  Community, including
establishment  of  its  strongly  trade-diverting  Common  Agricultural  Policy,  contributed  an
economic gain of just 0.3-to-0.4 percent of Community GDP per annum. Recent ex ante studies
using multi-country CGE models find similarly modest welfare impacts of regional integration
arrangements among "small" less developed countries and advanced countries whose firns  are
predominantly perfect competitors in domestic and international markets.
Policy Guideline 1
4  At this point,  the  partial  equilibrium  nature  of  the basic  Vinerian  framework  begins  to strain  credulity  on some
important  counts  that are developed  in the next subsection  and Section  3. For instance,  comparative  advantage
theory  suggests  that neighboring  countries  are unlikely  to be internationally  competitive  producers  of the large
number  of  products  consumed  by residents  of most  countries  today.  This  consideration  would  limit  the number  of
cases  in which  regional  integration  arrangements  among  especially  small  countries  might  be predominantly  trade
creating  owing  to member  countries'  international  competitiveness  in many  products.  Also,  the assumption  of
unlimited  capability  to produce  exportables  at constant  unit costs  is an extreme  one. Moreover,  the assumption
creates  a  bias in favor of finding positive  trade creation  effects  under regional integration  arrangements.
Specifically,  the assumption  causes  erstwhile  trade  with  non-member  countries  to be supplanted  entirely  by trade12
Under constant cost conditions, a customs union or free trade  area established among "small"
countries unable to influence their external terms of trade will be predominantly trade-creating and
welfare-improving for the trading bloc and its individual member countries if member countries
are predominantly least-cost producers of exportables by international standards. If one or more
member countries are inefficient producers of exportables, causing substantial diversion of trade
with  non-member  countries,  the  inefficient member  countries  will  gain  from  the  regional
integration arrangement. Efficient member countries, on the other hand, will not necessarily gain
because welfare gains resulting from trade creation might not be  sufficient to  offset welfare and
tariff revenue losses resulting from trade  diversion. It  is also uncertain in such circumstances
whether the trading bloc as a whole will gain.
Few if any quantitative studies of regional integration arrangements have examined the
implications  of  forgone  tariff  revenues  under  regional  integration  arrangements  for  the
development  (or  lack  of  development)  of  intra-regional  compensatory  payment  schemes.
Nonetheless, the importance of forgone tariff revenues under regional integration arrangements in
the Vinerian framework needs to  be emphasized. Whereas the Harberger triangles  in Figure  1
measuring  economic gains  associated with  the  consumption and  production  effects  of  trade
creation might be small in many cases, the rectangles in Figure 1 representing tariff revenue losses
will often be  comparatively large. Although tariff revenues are frequently considered transfers
between domestic consumers and government (with no net impact on national welfare), reduced
tariff revenues  under  regional integration  arrangements are  not  fully captured  by  domestic
consumers when imports from high-cost member countries replace imports from low-cost non-
member  countries,  as  shown  in  Figure  1(a).  Thus,  in  trade-diverting  regional  integration
arrangements, tariff revenue losses can be decisive in determining the overall welfare effect of the
regional integration arrangement on individual member countries and the trading bloc as a whole.
In t cases where the formation of a customs union would result in net economic benefits for the
with member countries at reduced intra-bloc terms of trade, thereby giving rise to positive Hiarberger  welfare13
trading bloc, a facility for apportioning tariff revenues among union members might be necessary
to  enable the  countries that  gain from  formation of the  regional  integration  arrangement to
compensate the countries that lose.
triangles  associated  with induced  production  and consumption  effects.14
Policy Guideline 2
A  customs  union  or  free trade  area that  results  in welfare losses for  one  or  more member
countries might still be successfully implemented if welfare gains for other member countries are
sufficiently  large to provide a net welfare gain for the trading bloc as a whole and if a facility for
compensatory intra-bloc payments, typically involving apportionment of tariff revenues among
member countries, can be successfully  implemented such that member countries that gain from the
regional integration arrangement compensate member countries that lose.
In the Vinerian framework, spillover effects of regional integration arrangements on non-
member countries do not occur. The customs union or free trade area is assumed to be "small" in
terms of its share of world  trade. Accordingly, the  customs union  is a  "price-taker" in world
markets and unable to affect international terms of trade for goods. In Figure 1, this assumption is
represented  by  the  constant  price  for  exportables  produced  by  the  non-member  country.
Consequently, within the  stylized Vinerian framework, the  economic welfare  of  non-member
countries is unaffected by the formation of a regional integration arrangement, and the change in
world  economic welfare is  identical to  the  aggregate  change in  welfare of  countries  in  the
preferential trading  arrangement. Thus, if the contribution of the  customs union to  economic
welfare in the trading bloc is uncertain, the contribution of the customs union to world economic
welfare is also uncertain.
The uncertainty of welfare effects under regional integration arrangements contrast sharply
with  the  certainty of  welfare effects under  MFN  liberalization (i.e., non-discriminatory trade
liberalization). As evaluated in Table 1 (based on Figure 1), concerted MFN liberalization by the
would-be  members  of  the  customs  union  is  everywhere trade-creating  and  nowhere  trade-
diverting. That is, MIFN  liberalization results in net trade creation and improved economic welfare
everywhere, including for  each would-be  customs union member. Consider,  for  instance, the15
home country in Figure 1. Under a customs union, the home country's trade with non-member
countries would be diverted in some if not substantial measure. On the other hand, under MFN
liberalization  consumers  increase  their  consumption  of  traded  goods  guided  solely  by
nondiscriminatory price considerations, eliminating  the possibility of trade diversion. Thus, under
MFN liberalization consumers would be expected to increase their purchases of goods produced
in  not  only  prospective  member  countries but  also non-mernber countries, fully reaping  the
potential consumption gains [area (c+g+h) in Figure 1(a) and (b)] and resource allocation gains
[area (a+d+e)] in both the home country and the partner country.
Viner Model with Increasing Costs of Production
The Viner model can be extended to  consider the important case of increasing costs of
producing exportables in the countries forming a customs union, as illustrated in Figure 2. The
case of increasing costs of production is appropriate to the circumstances of individual countries
and small groups of countries whose natural resource base and other productive endowments are
typically limited, especially in comparison to the world economy at large. The earlier assumption
that unit costs of production are constant in the non-member country is maintained, enforcing the
condition that the home country and the partner country are both price-takers in world markets."5
Finally, for ease of  exposition, the analysis here considers ordy the home country's imports of
goods 1, as if formation of a customs union between the home country and partner country would
result only in expanded imports of good 1 from the partner country by the home country.
15  For ease of analysis and exposition, the partner  country is assumed to have no domestic demand for good 1, and
therefore in Figure 2 the partner  country's supply schedule for good 1 is also the partner  country's export supply
schedule for good 1.16
As before, a customs union between the home country and partner country gives rise to
trade diversion in the home country, area (e + f). However, it does not necessarily give rise to
trade creation because the partner country's margin of preference does not necessarily result in a
lower price for good  1 in the home country. Indeed, so long as the partner country's capacity to
increase exports is less than the home country's initial total  demand for imports of good  1, the
home country will continue to import good 1 from the non-member country (country N) and the
equilibrium price of good 1 in the home country will remain unchanged at PH'  (equal to PN 1 plus
the specific tariff of the home country, TH1).
That trade with non-member countries is not entirely diverted in Figure 2 occurs because
total capacity to produce good 1 in the customs union area is insufficient  to meet total demand for
the  good  at any price less than the pre-customs-union price,  PH 1. This seems  an  appropriate
assumption  for  many  low-income  developing  countries  forming  a  regional  integration
arrangement. It is also arguably an appropriate assumption for advanced countries. Production
capabilities of advanced countries may be greater than those of less developed countries, but they
still might not  be sufficient to  satisfy intra-bloc demands for tradables entirely and to  result in
complete cessation of trade with non-member countries as predicted by the Viner model under
constant cost conditions (and assumed homogeneous goods).
The trade and welfare effects of forming a customs union between the home country and
partner country under the increasing cost conditions shown in Figure 2 are summarized in Table
2. From the home country's perspective, the customs union is trade-diverting on a net basis, and
the customs union  has no  impact on the economic welfare  of either  individual producers  or
individual consumers. Because exports of good 1 by the partner country are insufficient to meet
fully the home country's demand for imports under a regional integration arrangement, the price17
of good  1 in the home country is unchanged and, accordingly, both demand. and production of
good  1 in the home country are also unchanged. The improved competitiveness of producers of
good 1 in the partner country simply goes to diverting a portion of the home country's imports of
good 1 from non-member countries.
Overall economic welfare in the home country is adversely affected however. In extending
a tariff preference to  the partner country, the home country gives up previously collected tariff
revenues on both initial imports and "new" imports from the partner country [area [l+m+2(a+b)]
in Figure 2]. The forgone tariff revenues are "captured" in their entirety by producers of good 1 in
the partner country, at a comparatively small resource cost [area (a+b)]. Thus, the home country
loses, and the partner country gains from formation of the customs union. Moreover, as pointed
out by Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996) and Schiff (1996) with respect to the case of "natural"
trading partners, the forgone tariff revenues of the home country and the welfare gain of the
partner country are greater, the greater is the initial volume of trade between the home country
and partner country (so long as the non-member country initially supplies an appreciable volume
of imports to the home country, as depicted in Figure 2).
Finally, the  customs  union  and the  world  economy both  lose  from  formation  of the
hypothetical customs union in Figure 2. Specifically,  welfare of the trading bloc and, by extension,
welfare of the world economy are reduced by the incremental cost of the resources  utilized to
expand production of good  1 at higher cost in the partner country than the non-member country
[area (a+b)]  .6
16 Notwithstanding that the customs union and world economy lose from formation  of the custom union under the
increasing costs depicted in Figure 2, the direct impact of the formation  of the customs union on private economic
surplus is either neutral (home country) or positive (partner country). The losses to the home country, the customs
union,  and  the world economy, respectively, hinge crucially on the  disposition of tariff revenues. Although it is
generally  assumed  that tariff revenue  gains and losses  are shared  through lump-sum  transfers  by the government  to18
Are regional integration arrangements pursued by relatively open economies more likely to
be trade-creating, as sometimes claimed? Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996) demonstrate that the
answer  to  this  question  is  no.  Under  high  protection  in  the  home  country  (and  therefore
substantially smaller volume of initial imports by the home country than depicted in Figure 2), a
regional integration arrangement between the home country and partner country might well result
in a lower price for imports in the home country and complete cessation of trade between the
home country and non-member country. In this circumstance, net trade creation might occur, and
the home country might achieve welfare gains similar to  those  found under constant  costs  of
production. In contrast,  under  a relatively open trading regime in the home country,  such as
depicted in Figure 2, a regional integration arrangement between the home country and partner
country will not result in a lower price for imports in the home country, nor will imports from
non-member countries be  completely diverted. In fact, under increasing cost  conditions in the
Viner model, a  relatively open trading regime will tend  to  ensure that  a  regional  integration
arrangement will be trade diverting on a net basis and that welfare of the home country, trading
bloc, and world economy will decline, as summarized  in Table 2.
Policy Guideline 3
Under increasing costs conditions, a customs union or free trade area established among small
countries unable to influence their external terms of trade will be predominantly trade diverting so
long as non-member countries continue to supply imports to member countries. Although member
country producers  whose exports to  other member countries are increased under  the regional
integration arrangement will enjoy welfare gains, the welfare of member countries will typically
decline because they give up  substantial tariff revenues and enjoy no overall increase in their
imports. Welfare of the trading bloc and (equivalently) the  world economy will also  typically
decline, owing to the greater resources necessary to  expand exports by member countries than
consumers, such transfers may be heavily discounted  by consumers in the modem age of large govermment
bureaucracies  and deficit spending, in which case private sector support  for regional integration arrangements
might be stronger  than otherwise.19
necessary to  supply the same exports by non-member countries. The certainty of welfare losses
occurring under increasing cost conditions is greater, the less highly protectionist are, initially, the
countries forming the regional integration arrangement.
The implications of highly protected economies versus more open economies formling a
regional integration arrangement have not been specifically explored in recent quantitative studies
of regional integration arrangements. Also, notwithstanding the increasing use of multi-country
CGE  models to  investigate the  possible effects of  customs unions and  free trade  areas, few
quantitative studies have purposely considered the global trade and welfare effects of increasing
regionalism among less developed countries if not advanced countries. Most recent quantitative
studies either  fall back on the  maintained assumption of the  Viner model (and  "small union"
Meade  model  discussed  in  the  next  section) that  countries  forming a  regional  integration
arrangement have little or  no power  to  influence international terms of trade  for goods  (and
services) or volume of world trade significantly, or they simply provide little indication of what
the  estimated or  simulated spillover effects of recent regional integration arrangements on the
greater world economy are.
Finally, it is again interesting to  consider the comparable trade  and welfare effects of
concerted MFN trade liberalization, also summarized in Table 2. As found in the case of constant
production costs, MIFN trade liberalization under increasing costs of production in the customs
union results  solely in trade  creation in the home country."'  Also again, trade  creation has its
counterparts  in both  production  and  consumption effects, and,  notwithstanding forgone  tariff
revenues, MFN liberalization results in a net welfare gain for the home country. This welfare gain
derives from the  improved allocation of  domestic resources  [area (a+k+m)  in Figure  2]  and
increased consumption possibilities [area d]. Moreover, becausie  the partner country is unaffected20
by nondiscriminatory trade liberalization in the home country, both the customs union and world
economy at large gain from unilateral trade liberalization in the home country, namely, by the total
amount of the welfare gain in the home country [area (a+k+m+d)].
Two recent ex ante studies of the new free trade area among the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (Asean), the Asean Free Trade Area (Afta), by DeRosa (1995) and by Lewis and
Robinson (1996) provide basic support for the dominance of (concerted) M:FN  trade liberalization
over preferential regional trade liberalization, albeit using CGE models that represent the Asean
economies in considerably more complex terms than depicted in Figure 2. Both  studies find that
the predominantly middle-income countries of Southeast Asia (the so-called Asean-4: Indonesia,
Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand) gain significantly  more in terms of improved welfare from
simultaneously liberalizing their trade regimes on a nondiscriminatory basis (MiFN liberalization)
than on a discriminatory basis (Afta). For instance, DeRosa finds that whereas economic welfare
(measured by real absorption) in the Asean-4 improves typically by less than about 0.5 percent
under Afta, it improves by more than 4.0 percent under concerted MEFN  liberalization.
3.  Modern Static Theory of Regional Integration Arrangements
The Viner model and its framework for analyzing  regional integration arrangements do not
lie comfortably within the bounds of modem neoclassical trade  theory, whose boundaries are
defined fundamentally by general equilibrium theory and its emphasis on interrelationships among
markets for goods and factors of production throughout an economy. Moreover, regionalism in
the world economy today involves not only "small" blocs of countries but  also "large" blocs of
countries that count potentially for an appreciable share of world trade. Therefore, in principle, a
17 Production and exports of good 1 by the partner  country are unchanged because the effective world price of good21
more  general  framework for  considering the  static  economic; effects of  regional  integration
arrangements is desirable, namely, a framework admitting substitution of goods in demand and
supply, simultaneous adjustment of interrelated markets for goods and factors of production in
trading countries, and possible international terms of trade effects impinging significantly  on trade
and economic welfare in individual countries and the world at large.
Meade and the Theory of Second Best
In  a  less  widely  recognized volume  on  the  theory  of  customs  unions  than  Viner's
contribution, Meade (1955) outlined if not fully developed the modern static theory of regional
integration  arrangements."'  Meade's  analytical framework explicitly admitted  trade  by  many
countries  in  many  commodities.  Reflecting  the  "culture"  oif the  day,  Meade  relied  upon
macroeconomic policies to ensure full equilibrium (including equtilibrium  in international payment
balances). However, his framework pointed clearly to the central role of prices and international
terms of trade for achieving and maintaining equilibrium in international trade and payments under
preferential trading arrangements. Finally, Meade focused his analysis on the economic welfare of
the world economy, not simply  the countries forming a regional integration arrangement. In going
beyond the "small country" perspective of the Vinerian framework, he recognized the potential for
significant secondary effects of regional integration arrangements on third-countries and the world
economy at large owing to adjustment in world markets for traded (and nontraded) goods.
I is unaffected  by MEN trade liberalization  in the home country,  as shown  in Figure  2.
18  For a recent and thoroughgoing discussion of Meade's theory of customs union, see Panagariya  (1996). Notably,
notwithstanding  the title of his volume,  Meade did not analyzed the implications of customs unions  per  se but
rather the broader class of preferential  trading arrangements  which do not necessarily  stipulate the adoption  of
common  external  tanffs or other import control  measures.22
Meade's  volume also lent considerable inspiration to  the  development of the  so-called
theory of second-best (Lipsey and Lancaster 1956/57). The theory of second-best holds that for
distorted economic systems, eliminating  one set of distortions does not guarantee an improvement
in overall economic welfare so long as other economic distortions remain unchanged. As it applies
to the static theory of regional integration arrangements, the theory of second-best implies that
reducing  tariffs  on  a  discriminatory basis under  a  regional  integration  arrangement  (and  so
seemingly moving in the direction of Pareto optimality) does not guarantee an improvement in
welfare for individual countries or the world economy, as maintained originally by Viner (1950).19
Accordingly,  the  numerous  circumstances  surrounding  individual  regional  integration
arrangements  in  the  Meade  tradition  of  general  equilibriumn  analysis matter  importantly  for
whether the arrangements are welfare-enhancing. Moreover, they make generalizations regarding
the economic benefits of customs unions and free trade areas extremely difficult.
The Meade Model
Meade  abandoned the Vinerian assumption of constant  costs  of production  in trading
countries and recognized the necessity of ensuring equilibrium.  in international payments balances.
Thus, Meade brought to the fore adjustment in both international and domestic relative prices to
achieve (general) equilibrium under regional integration arrangements. These refinements to  the
static  theory  of  regionalism admit  the  possibility of  not  only  spillover  effects  of  regional
integration  arrangements on  non-member countries but  also  feedback  effects of  international
19 More generally, unilateral  trade  liberalization by an individual  country may  not be welfare-improving  if the
country is sufficiently "large" or other trading  countries are  sufficiently highly protected to cause the individual
country's  terms  of  trade  to  deteriorate  as  it reduces its  trade barriers  unilaterally  and  expands  its  exports  to
maintain balance of payments equilibrium.23
adjustments  to  the  formation  of  regional  integration  arrangements  on  member  countries
themselves.
Basic Small Union Model
Meade's  general or  "large union" model is not  easily represented in textbook  or policy
discussions. More widely considered is the "small  union" Meade model in which the conditions for
international payments  equilibrium by  member countries  are observed  under  increasing  cost
conditions in all sectors but in which the international terms of trade are assumned  constant.
Figure  3  illustrates the  basic small union  model for  two  small countries  that  form  a
preferential trading arrangement and trade in only two goods (goods  1 and 2).20  The schedules
depicted in Figure  3 are general equilibrium trade  offer curves  rather than partial equilibrium
demand and supply schedules. The offer curves, OH  and Op, indicate the volume of exports that
the home country and the partner country are respectively willing to exchange for imports under
very general demand and supply conditions in both countries at different international terms of
trade, while maintaining balance of payments equilibrium. Initially, the two countries are assumed
to enforce substantial tariffs against imports, and to trade "short" of their free-trade offer curves,
at points EHN°  and EPN°,  respectively, along the ray ON  that represents the offer curve of the non-
member country (representing, again, the rest  of the world). That the slope of ON is constant
reflects the fact that the international terms of trade for goods 1 and 2 are not  affected by the
volume of trade by either the home country or partner country.
Under  a  customs  union  or  free  trade  area  in which  external tariffs and  other  trade
restrictions are sufficiently high that the home country and the partner country trade exclusively
20  Figure 3 and the discussion of the figure in the text are adapted from Pomfret (1988).24
with  one another  (i.e., the regional integration arrangement is  completely trade-diverting), the
trade  and  intra-bloc payments  equilibrium for  the  two  countries  occurs  at  point  EHp. This
equilibrium determines the domestic and intra-bloc terms of trade  for members of the regional
integration arrangement given by the dashed line in Figure 3. From the perspective of the partner
country, the equilibrium at EHP  is superior to equilibrium under either protection or free-trade. 21
However,  from  the  perspective of  the  home  country,  the  equilibrium at  EBP is  inferior to
equilibrium  under protection or free trade. First, the home country's "income terms of trade" (i.e.,
the  international terms  of  trade  multiplied by the  country's  export  volume)  are lower,  and,
consequently, its volume of imports is lower, under the regional integration arrangement than
under protection. And second, as is apparent in Figure 3, under free trade rather than the regional
integration arrangement, the home country could admit a  greater  volume of imports from all
countries  on a  duty-free basis and, in so doing, expand its  exports  along the  more favorable
international terms of trade, ON,  offered by the non-member country until equilibrium is reached at
point EHN,  corresponding to a higher level of welfare than a point EHP.
Thus, in the small union Meade model the distribution of economic gains among member
countries  in  a  regional  integration  agreement is extremely important for  the  stability of the
agreement. In fact, in the simple two-good model underlying the trade offer-schedules in Figure 3,
one member country always loses from formation of a regional integration arrangement, relative
to the pre-integration circumstances of the member countries or to the opportunities for member
countries  to  improve  their  trade  and  welfare  under  unilateral  nondiscriminatory  trade
21 If the partner  country liberalizes its imports on a nondiscriminatory basis, its new trade equilibrium  would occur
at point EPN.  Figure 3 shows that the free trade equilibrium for the partner country is superior to the initial
equilibrium  at EPN°,  but it is inferior  to the equilibrium  under the regional integration  arrangement  at EHP.  Thus,
the partner country  should be expected  to prefer  joining the regional  integration  arrangement  depicted  in Figure  3
to undertaking  unilateral  nondiscriminatory  tariff reduction.25
liberalization. Again, as in the Vinerian analytical framework, compensatory schemes involving
lump-sum or  other transfers between member countries would be  necessary to  ensure that  all
member countries benefit from a regional integration arrangement. Also, from the welfare changes
for the home and partner country depicted in Figure 3, it is not clear that the trading bloc as a
whole necessarily gains from the regional integration arrangement. 22
Finally, with regard to welfare in the rest of the world, in Figure 3 the assumption of a
perfectly elastic trade offer curve for the rest of the world implies that, even though trade between
member countries and non-member countries ceases completely under the regional integration
arrangement,23  global spillover effects of the regional integration arrangement are negligible, not
unlike in the Vinerian framework.
In the  discussion here, the welfare benefits of the regional integration arrangement are
considered mainly in terms  of underlying community preferences  for  traded  goods,  without
necessary  reference  to  the  Vinerian notions  of  trade  creation  or  diversion. This  means  of
evaluating regional trading arrangements is in keeping with modern international trade theory, as
discussed  by  Kowalczyk  (1990),  and  with  recent  ex  ante  quantitative  studies  of  regional
integration arrangements (considered in Section 5).
Small Union Model with Incomplete Trade Diversion
22  In Figure 3, if protection  in the home country  and partner country is so high as to restrict imports to near-
autarkic levels initially, then a regional integration  agreement  between  the two countries will be unambiguously
welfare-improving  for both countries.
23  In Figure 3, the home country and the partner country trade exclusively  with one another under a regional
integration arrangement.  Illustrations  of customs  unions and free trade areas admitting incomplete  diversion of
trade between  member  countries  and non-member  countries  in the small union Meade  model  are considered  in the
next sub-section.26
Direction of trade  data for members of regional integration arrangements indicate that
trade  with  non-member  countries does  not  cease after  regional integration arrangements  are
formed, contrary to  the outcome in Figure 3 and  similar analyses using the basic small union
Meade  model  (e.g.,  Wonnacott  and Wonnacott  1981). This  direction of  trade  evidence may
reflect the existence of traded goods that are differentiated by their place of production (discussed
in  Section 4). However, incomplete trade  diversion under  regional integration arrangements is
also a possible outcome in the small union Meade model assuming trade in homogeneous goods.
Customs Union. Unfortunately, when trade continues with non-member countries under a
customs  union,  diagrammatic analysis becomes  more  complicated. For  the  exposition  here,
assume that a customs union sets its common external tariff equal to the average tariff level of the
home country and partner country. This case conforms importantly to GATT Article XXIV which
stipulates that a regional integration arrangement should not raise the average level of protection
against non-member countries.
In the depiction of this case in Figure 4, the home country and the partner country both
continue to trade  along the international terms of trade ON. Because the initial level of import
tariffs is assumed higher in the home country than the partner country, equilibrium of the home
country under  the  customs  union  occurs  at  a  point  such  as  EHN 1 (closer  to  the  free-trade
equilibrium at EHN),  where economic welfare in the home country is greater  than at the initial
equilibrium of the home country at EHN°.  At the same time, equilibrium of the partner  country
under  the  customs  union  occurs  at  a  point  such  as EPN (further  away  from  the  free-trade
equilibrium at EPN),  where  economic welfare in the  partner country is less than at  the initial
equilibrium of the partner country at EPN°.27
Thus, not (qualitatively)  unlike the outcome in Figure 3 using the basic small union Meade
model, the home country gains while the partner country loses from the formation of the customs
union. Unfortunately, it is not clear from Figure 4 whether the home country might compensate
the  partner  country  for  its  loss  and  thereby  ensure  formation  of  the  regional  integration
arrangement. However, it would not be difficult  to demonstrate that, if the two countries adopt a
common external tariff much closer to  the initially lower tariff level of the partner country, the
welfare gain of the home country would become sufficiently larger than the welfare loss of the
partner  country to  guarantee existence of a  compensatory scheme whereby the  home country
could more than compensate the partner country for any welfare loss associated with formation of
the customs union.
Free Trade  Area.  With continued trade  between member countries  and non-member
countries, a free trade area is subject to a number of possible outcomes in the small union Meade
model, depending upon the commodity composition of trade between member countries and non-
member countries after the free trade area is formed. 24 If the assumption here is maintained, both
before and after the free trade area is formed, that on a combined basis the home country and the
partner  country  are  net  exporters  of  the  first  comrnodity and  net  importers  of  the  second
commodity, then under the free trade area the protection levels and domestic relative prices of the
home country will prevail in both member countries of the regional integration arrangement. As
depicted in Figure 5, the partner country will benefit from the opportunity to  trade exclusively
with the home country at the higher (to the partner country) intra-bloc terms of trade (P 1 /P2)H.
However, it is likely that the home country will suffer a loss in economic welfare because under
the free trade area, after account is taken of the home country's duty-free trade with the partner
24 See Kemp (1969) for a comprehensive treatment of possible outcomes under different assumptions.28
country, the home country can only exchange a smaller proportion of its exports of good  1 for
imports  of  good  2  at  the  more  favorable international terms  of  trade  ON.  Thus,  as  found
previously in the case of a customs union with incomplete trade diversion, it is not clear that the
home country and the partner country will both benefit from a  free trade  area, or  that  either
country will gain sufficiently  to compensate the other country for its possible economic loss under
the free trade area.
In both  its basic form and more complex forms, including variants that  assume trade in
three goods, 25 the small union Meade model has been widely studied. Among the most widely
cited analytical results of the small union model, initially reported by Meade (1955, p.35) himself,
is the result that if a country entering into a regional integration agreement increases its imports
from all sources (including non-member countries), the country will enjoy an improvement in its
economic welfare. 26 This result is appealing and sensible, including in terms of Viner's concept of
net  trade  creation. However,  from  a  policy perspective, it  provides  little insight  into  what
circumstances or conditions surrounding countries forming a regional integration agreement might
25 In the three-country,  three-good  variant of the small union Meade  model, it is typically  assumed  that the home
country  and partner country  specialize  in the production  of one good  each, while the non-member  country  produces
all three goods. Under restrictive assumptions regarding the degree of substitutability  of  the three goods in
demand, all three countries may produce the three goods without sacrificing  some of the interesting analytical
results  found using the simpler  three-country,  three-good  variant of the small union Meade model. See McMillan
and McCann  (1981) and Panagariya  (1996).
26 For further discussion,  see Lipsey (1970),  Baldwin  and Venables  (1995) and Panagariya  (1996). Lipsey  (1970)
reports  three other  interesting results  based on the small  union  Meade  model:
1. A regional integration arrangement  that reduces  the tariff on the partner country's good is
more likely  to be beneficial  than the arrangement  that removes  the tariff entirely;
2. A regional integration  arrangement  is more likely to raise welfare  the higher is the level of
tariff on the partner country  initially  in relation  to the tariff on the non-member  country;  and
3. A necessary  condition  for preferential  liberalization  to improve  a country's  welfare is that it
lower the country's  expenditure  on its domestic  good thereby  increasing  the volume of imports,
both measured  at world  prices.29
guarantee that the arrangement would result in an expansion of the trade  of member countries
from all sources. Moreover, most quantitative studies find that regional integration arrangements
result in  at  least  some  diversion of trade  with  non-member countries. Thus,  it  is frequently
recommended that  countries forming a preferential trading arrangement should simultaneously
lower their external barriers to trade so that their imports from all trading partners will increase
and the impact of the arrangement on regional economic welfare and world economnic  welfare will
both be positive.
Policy Guideline 4
In a general equilibrium setting under increasing cost conditions in both memnber  and non-member
countries, a customs union or free trade area established among countries unable to influence their
external terms of trade individually or as a trading bloc will be welfare-improving for individual
member countries and the trading bloc if the regional integration arrangement increases imports
by member countries from all trading partners. To ensure this outcome, member countries of a
new trading bloc should simultaneously  reduce their barriers to trade with non-member countries.
Barring this strategy, a regional integration arrangement formed by a relatively small number of
countries will result in at least one member country being madle  better off and the possibility of
one or more member countries being made worse off, raising the advisability of establishing a
facility for compensatory intra-bloc payments to ensure that all member countries enjoy economic
gains when the trading bloc as a whole is welfare-improving.
Large Union Model
The large union Meade model encompasses possible global spillover effects of regional
integration  arrangements operating  through  not  only diversion of trade  but  also  changes  in
international terms of trade.  It is also appropriate for assessing the avowed objective of many
regional  integration  arrangements  to  defend  and,  as  possible,  improve  member  countries'
See Panagariya  (1996) for further discussion and the derivation of these results in terms of a compact version of the30
international  terms of trade in response  to new or reinvigorated  regional  integration  arrangements
in other areas of the world.
Unfortunately,  the large union Meade model  has not been fully  explored  by modem-day
economic  theoreticians. 27 Broadly speaking,  the large union Meade model poses analytical  and
policy  issues similar  to those associated  with the optimal  tariff issue for individual  countries. In
this connection,  changes  in intra-regional  and extra-regional  trade may  have significant  impacts  on
international prices for traded goods impinging  on  the  economic welfare of both  member
countries  and non-member  countries.  If either the volume  of non-member  countries'  exports or
their international  terms of trade are adversely  affected by a regional  integration arrangement,
then the welfare of non-member  countries  and possibly  the welfare of the world economy  might
be significantly  repressed. 28
This possibility,  which has been discussed in the context of large blocs of not only
advanced  countries  but also large blocs  of less developed  countries  with potential  market power,
is among  the most prominent  issues surrounding  regionalism  today. Based on early insights  by
Meade (1955, p. 98), Ohyama  (1972) and Kemp  and Wan (1976) offer an interesting  theoretical
perspective  on this issue. In what is popularly  termed the Kemp-Wan  theorem, these economic
theoreticians  proved that for any proposed  customs  union or free trade area there exists a set of
common  external  tariffs  that would  precisely  leave  the new trading  bloc's trade with non-member
countries  unchanged,  so that the welfare of the latter countries  would not be affected and any
improvement  to the welfare  of the integrating  countries  would strictly  add  to world welfare.
small  union Meade  model.
27 For  an early analysis  of the welfare implications  of customs unions  under endogenous international  terms  of
trade, see Mundell (1964).31
Despite its elegance, the Kemp-Wan theorem has not proven to be operationally relevant
to  date. Recently, Srinivasan (1996)  usefully derived an operational  "characterization'  of the
Kemp-Wan common external tariff structure for  a customs tnion,  namely, as  a consumption-
weighted average of pre-union tariffs and subsidies in member countries. Notwithstanding this
seemingly practical, development, there  remains the  political-economy problem  of  reaching  a
consensus in favor of establishing such a common external tariff structure, inclusive of possibly
requisite  lump-sum transfers  to  ensure all member countries  share in the welfare gain of the
customs union or free trade area.29
The Kemp-Wan theorem has occasionally been invoked as a "test" of the desirability of
existing regional integration arrangements. Specifically, some analysts have suggested that  if a
regional integration arrangement promotes exports from non-member countries to the members of
the trading arrangement, the arrangement must improve the welfare of non-member countries and
the world economy as a whole. Richardson (1995) and Winters (1997) have both objected to such
interpretations of the Kemp-Wan theorem.
Richardson argues that in a world in which countries behave optimally, any attempt by
members of a customs union to set their common external tariffs in a manner to guarantee that no
non-member country is harmed by the union would likely be met by retaliatory tariff adjustments
by non-member countries that would leave members of the customs union (as a bloc) no better off
and possibly worse off than before.
Winters  demonstrates  that  increased  exports  by  non-member  countries  to  member
countries under a regional integration arrangement is an inappropriate application of the Kemp-
28 Feedback  effects  of international  terms of trade changes  on the welfare  of individual  member  countries  would  be
mainly positive or mainly negative accordingly as the member counbies are net exporters or net importers,
respectively,  of commodities  whose  terms of trade increase  in international  markets.32
Wan theorem. This follows because the welfare of non-member countries is not  monotonically
related to  their  exports  to  member countries.  Essentially, the  welfare impacts  of a  regional
integration arrangement on non-member countries must be estimated more directly, for instance,
on the basis of changes in imports by non-member countries (and changes in their terms of trade),
because residents of non-member countries, like residents of other countries, fundamentally derive
enjoyment from consumning  rather than producing goods. 30
4.  Extensions and Special Cases
The large union  Meade model does not  yield ready guidelines on regional integration
arrangements for policy makers owing to both the difficulty  of deriving analytical solutions to the
model  and  the  problem  of  making generalizations about  policy options  that  fall within  the
particularly wide bounds of the theory of second-best. For these reasons, economists have been
drawn to  a process  of identifying special cases and circumstances that  are more amenable to
solution in general equilibrium models, and more amenable to  deriving clear insights or policy
prescriptions to issues surrounding regional integration arrangements.
This section discusses some prominent extensions and special cases of not only the Meade
model but  also the  Viner model, with a  view to  identifying and delineating additional policy
guidelines that emanate from the static theory of regional integration arrangements. As in Sections
2  and  3, unless otherwise  stated,  most  orthodox  assumptions underlying the  pure  theory  of
international trade are maintained, including especially the assumptions of perfect competition and
production and consumption of homogeneous traded goods.
29 For further discussion, see, for instance, Bhagwati (1992).33
Country Size and "Natural" Trading Partners
The economic size of countries joining a regional integration arrangement has been of
considerable interest to  economists recently (e.g., Bhagwati and Panagariya 1996; Schiff 1996).
Principally at issue  is whether a  small country can expect to  gain more from joining a  large
regional integration arrangement than a small regional integration arrangement.
A related issue is whether trading countries that have a. mutual affinity for trade with one
another (so-called natural trading partners), owing, for instanice,  to  strong complementarity of
resource  endowments or geographic proximity, should expect to  gain more substantially from
forming a regional integration arrangement than other countries, as maintained recently by some
prominent policy makers and special reports on regionalism. 31
Being a small country unable to influence  the terms of Trade  of would-be partner countries
in a regional integration agreement can be a distinct advantage. Schiff (1996) finds that a small
country joining a large regional trading arrangement is likely to gain in a similar manner to a small
country liberalizing its  trade  on a unilateral MFN basis. By reducing tariffs on imports  from
member countries of a trading bloc that is sufficiently large to  satisfy a  small country's  entire
import demands at little or no increase above the prevailing international terms of trade, a small
country  will  unambiguously  increase  its  welfare,  specifically,  through  welfare-improving
combinations of increased consumption of low cost imports, reduced production  of high cost
domestic substitutes, and reduced consumption of imports from inefficient "small" third-counties.
Moreover,  Schiff finds that the smaller the initial level of trade with the large trading bloc, the
30  A similar difficulty can arise in  connection with attempting to assess the welfare impacts of a  regional
integration  arrangement  on member countries using solely net trade creation as an indicator. See, for instance,
Kowalczyk  (1990).34
greater  will be  the  welfare  gain for  the  small country  because  of  the  greater  margin  for
substitution in demand by the small country away from high cost goods produced domestically or
high cost  goods  imported  from third-countries, to  lower  cost  goods imported  from  efficient
countries in the large trading bloc.
Conversely, if a small country joins a small regional integration arrangement that is unable
to  meet  its  total  demand  for  imports  except  at  substantially higher border  prices,  so  that
consumers in the country must continue to purchase imports from third-countries at a high price
(namely, the international terms of trade adjusted for the import tariff originally  levied on an MFN
basis), then not only the small country but also the regional trading bloc as a whole will be worse
off  as  a  consequence  of  accession  of  the  small country  to  the  small regional  integration
arrangement. Analogous to the outcome in the Viner model under increasing costs of production,
the small country will be worse off by the amount of its forgone tariff revenues on imports from
member countries in the small regional integration arrangement, and the trading bloc as a whole
will be worse off by the amount of resources in member countries devoted to  expanding exports
to the small country (see Table 2).
Policy Guideline 5
Under increasing cost conditions, a small country unable to affect its international terms of trade
will increase its welfare by joining a "large" regional integration arrangement whose intra-bloc
relative prices will not be affected by accession of a small country to the arrangement. Conversely,
a small country will reduce its welfare by joining a "small" regional integration arrangement that
cannot supply a greater volume of imports to the small country except at higher intra-bloc prices,
in which case welfare of the trading bloc itself will also be reduced.
31 See,  for instance,  Summers  (1991)  and EU (1995).35
With  regard  to  the  issue  of  "natural" trading  partners,  it  has  been  suggested  that
neighboring countries or countries whose relative resource endowments are highly complementary
- in both cases, giving rise to appreciable initial levels of tradle - should be expected to expand
their trade relations significantly under a regional integration arrangement and, thereby, derive
particularly  large  benefits  from  forming a  regional  trading  bloc.  However,  as  reported  by
Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996)  and  Schiff (1996),  under  a regional integration  arrangement
between natural trading partners, tariff revenue losses ("rectangle" effects) arising because natural
trading partners will initially enjoy more extensive mutual trade relations than other countries are
likely to  be  substantial. Moreover,  in the  event that  margins of  preference under  a  regional
integration  arrangement give rise  to  welfare gains from  positive  consumption  or  production
effects ("triangle" effects), the tariff revenue losses are likely to be greater than the production-
related and  consumption-related welfare gains. Thus, contrary to  the  natural trading  partners
hypothesis, economic gains from forming a trading bloc are likely to be smaller, the greater is the
initial volume of trade  between would-be members of the  arrangement for  "natural" or  other
reasons.
Policy Guideline 6
Under  increasing  cost  conditions,  "natural" trading  partners  that  are  unable to  affect  their
international terms of trade will not experience substantial trade diversion on forming a regional
integration  arrangement  among  themselves.  However,  on  forning  a  regional  integration
arrangement, natural trading partners will also not  enjoy substantial gains  in welfare because
forgone tariff revenues will be nearly equal to, if not greater than, welfare gains from consumption
and production effects.36
Foreign Trade Barriers and Transport Costs
Among the most enduring issues surrounding regional. integration arrangements is why
countries choose to form customs unions or free trade areas when most analyses within either the
Vinerian framework or the Meade framework suggest that  unilateral trade  liberalization on  a
nondiscriminatory basis is usually a  superior policy option. Wonnacott and  Wonnacott (1981,
1992) provide a  possible answer to  this question that  highlights two  real-world obstacles to
international trade: foreign trade barriers and transportation costs.
Foreign  trade barriers and  transport  costs both  drive a wedge  between  the  price that
consumers in importing countries pay and the price producers in exporting countries receive for
the same traded goods. The Wonnacotts argue that this wedge might be sufficiently  large to offer
neighboring countries opportunities for expanding their mutual trade  on a preferential basis in a
manner that  captures the  price wedge  arising from substantial protection in third-countries or
from high transport costs for goods shipped to third-countries. Specifically,  with the adoption of a
customs union or free trade area, the member countries might be able to trade on more favorable
terms exclusively  with one another than with highly protected or distant third-countries. 32
This possibility is illustrated in Figure 6, which is based on the two-good representation of
the basic small union Meade model considered earlier. Recall that the offer curve of the non-
member country (representing the rest of the world) is given by the ray ON,  and that the slope of
ON  is the effective international terms of trade facing the home country and partner country in the
absence of trade restrictions or transportation costs. Suppose, however, that the home country's
exports of good  1 to the non-member country face either a substantial tariff or particularly high
32 The Wonnacott  and Wonnacott  analysis  of regional  integration  arrangements  does not consider the possibility  of
continued extra-bloc trade by member countries seeking to  circumvent  foreign trade barriers or high trade37
transport  costs. 33 As suggested by the Wonnacotts, this  situation might be  the case for,  say,
German exports of steel to the United States versus the United Kingdom, against the background
of the European  Union in which Germany and the United Kingdom are both  members. Such
circumstances would cause the non-member country's offer curve faced by the home country to
become  ON',  with  equilibrium for  the  home country under  unilateral nondiscriminatory trade
liberalization at EHN'.  The free-trade equilibrium at EHN'  is inferior to  the  equilibrium under  a
regional integration arrangement between the home country and partner country at EHP  for two
reasons: (1) the regional terms of trade facing the home country, (Pi/P2)Bp, are greater than the
international terms of trade given by the slope of the offer curve ON', and (2) the volume of trade
at EBp  is greater than the volume of trade at EHN'. 34 Thus, in Figure 6 both the home country and
the partner country (rather than solely the partner country, as found in discussion of the small
union Meade model and Figure 3) prefer a customs union or free trade area to  unilateral MFN
trade liberalization. 35
In Figure 6, the home country and partner country exchange trade preferences (giving up
tariff revenues on imports from one another) in order to capture the greater savings from the high
costs of protection or transport of goods associated with the home country's exports to the non-
member country.  This is  a  relevant finding, but  one  that  is  contingent upon  the  real-world
occurrence of significant  transactions costs for trade with non-member countries.
transportation  costs, in which case prospects  for welfare  gains under a regional integration  arrangement  might be
reduced.
33  Solely  for ease of exposition,  in Figure  6 only the home country  is assumed  to face high protection  and/or high
transport  costs in connection  with its exports  to the non-member  country.
34 The partner country  also prefers  regional  free-trade  equilibrium  at EBp  to the multilateral  free-trade  equilibrium
at EPN  for the same  two reasons,  namely,  the more favorable  terms of trade and more  favorable  trade volume  under
the regional  free-trade  equilibrium  at EHp.
35 As Pomfret (1988) notes, although the home country and partner country both gain, under the regional
integration arrangement in Figure 6 the non-member country loses owing to reduced imports and lost tariff38
Amjadi  and  Winters  (1997)  provide  a  rare  study  of  this  issue  that  focuses  on
transportation costs facing exports by member countries of the South American Common Market
(Mercosur). They investigate whether transportation costs between Mercosur countries and non-
member countries (represented by the United States) are  sufficiently high to  afford  significant
gains to Mercosur  countries under their new customs union. They find that transportation costs
for exports  destined for  countries outside Mercosur  are appreciably higher than intra-regional
transportation  costs.  However,  they  judge  that  the  margin  between  the  two  costs  is  not
sufficiently  large to result in a net welfare gain for Mercosur countries.
No  recent  quantitative  studies  using  multi-country  economic  models  have  directly
investigated the "'missing  foreign tariff' hypothesis advanced by the Wonnacotts. Nonetheless, it is
implicitly  true that, to the extent recent multi-country CGE models incorporate information about
levels of protection in not only member countries but also non-member countries, simulations of
these models must account in some measure for the benefits of regional integration arrangements
attributable to  circumventing extra-regional levels of protection. In this connection, an issue for
future analysis is whether such benefits are indeed being captured by these models, and, if they
are, whether such benefits are contributing appreciably if not critically to the generally positive
welfare effects of regional integration arrangements reported by studies using these models. 36
Policy Guideline 7
revenues.  Thus, the implications  for world welfare  are uncertain depending  upon the relative magnitudes  of the
welfare  gain by the customs  union and welfare  loss by the non-member  country.
36  As discussed  further below in this section  and the next section,  a complicating  factor in interpreting the results
of recent quantitative  studies  vis-a-vis  predictions  of Vinerian  and Meade  models  is that CGE models  employed  in
recent studies generally assume differentiated  goods rather than homogenous  goods, introducing possible (but
uncertain)  biases  in the results.39
Under increasing cost conditions, two  or more neighboring countries facing substantial foreign
trade barriers, transport costs, or other "hindrances"  to their exports to third-countries might form
a regional integration arrangement that will be welfare-improving to individual member countries
and possibly the trading bloc as a whole if the benefits of "capturing" the costs of the hindrances
to exports to third-countries through formation of the regional integration arrangement outweigh
the tariff revenue losses and other possible welfare costs of formiing  the trading bloc.40
Imperfect Competition, Scale Economies, and Differentiated Goods
During  the  last  two  decades with  the  advent  of  the  so-called  "new  trade  theory,"
international trade theoreticians have explored the implications for international trade and welfare
of imperfect competition between firms in an increasingly integrated world economy. 37 Under
imperfect competition, natural, technological, or policy-based barriers to market entry by firms
give  rise  to  monopolistic profits,  often  in  the  presence  of  increasing  returns  to  scale  and
production of differentiated goods, rather than homogeneous or like goods, by competing firms.
Among  the  earliest findings of  empirical studies  of  economic integration  in  Western
Europe  is that  the European  Community stimulated trade  in similar products  (so-called  intra-
industry  trade)  rather  than  trade  in  complementary products  (so-called  inter-industry trade),
contrary to the prediction of traditional comparative advantage theory in which countries do not
both  export  and  import  goods  produced  in  the  same  industry. 38 This  finding,  which  is
substantiated by more general studies of price competitiveness in international trade, 39 has led to
both theoretical and quantitative studies of regional integration under different assumptions about
the competitive structure of markets, scale economies, and product differentiation.
If scale economies can be realized, they offer individual firms valuable opportunities for
achieving greater international competitiveness. For high-technology firms in advanced countries,
achieving scale economies in the production of new products  can limit if not  exclude entry by
other firms in  "thin"  or  comparatively small-scale markets  for  new  products  (e.g.,  Krugman
1980). For firms in less developed countries, achieving scale economies in the  production  of
37 See  Helpman  and Krugman  (1985) and Krugrnan  (1995).
38  See, for instance, Verdoorn (1960), Balassa (1966), and Grubel  (1967). By 1977, according to Drabek and
Greenaway  (1984), intra-industry  trade among European  Community  countries  amounted  to more than two-thirds
of intra-bloc  trade in Western  Europe.
S  see,  in particular,  Kravis and Lipsey  (1971).41
nontraditional  products can contribute  to the transformation  Of  so-called  infant industries,  which
are  frequently a  burden on  public resources, into industries that  are  more  likely to  be
internationally  competitive  (e.g.,  Pearson and  Ingram  1980).
Although both Viner (1950) and Meade (1955) suggested that significant  gains from
regional  integration  arrangements  might  be associated  with scale economies,  Corden (1972) was
first to set down a formal  theory of their potential  importance  to trade and welfare  under customs
unions, albeit within an analytical  framework  that did not iformally  link scale economies  and
market  structure. Later,  Either and Horn (1984) and Smith and Venables (1988) offered more
sophisticated models of firm behavior integrating economic relationships among increasing returns
to  scale, imperfect competition, and segmented markets in which firms set different prices for the
same product in markets at home and abroad. 40
Essentially, inclusion of scale economies in the modern static theory of customs unions
identifies possibilities for "fortunate" firms in member countn'les  to produce greater quantities of
either differentiated or homogenous products after formation of a customs union or free trade
area when trade preferences and resulting shifts in demand in favor of intra-regional trade enable
these firms to achieve greater economies of scale and lower ouitput  prices as they not only capture
but also create larger markets for their output at home and abroad. Increased production by these
firms gives rise to economic gains in member countries, termed cost reduction effects by Corden
(1972), that are additional to production and consumption gains identified in the Viner and Meade
models. 4 '
40 These models are discussed  extensively  by Baldwin  and Venables  (L995).  The two models are also discussed
further below  in this section.
41 Scale  economies  can also give rise to trade suppression  effects  that are additional  to trade diversion  effects  under
a customs  union or free trade area. Trade suppression  effects  occur  when scale economies  give rise to reductions  in
non-member  country  exports to member  countries.  See  Corden (1972),  Robson  (1987), and Pomfret  (1988).42
Thus, in simple economic models in which scale economies are not  related formally to
market  structure,  scale economies  offer  a  possible additional source  of  economic  gains  for
countries forming regional integration arrangements. However, unlike in the case of high foreign
protection or transport costs considered previously, scale economies do not offer a reason why
regional  integration  arrangements might be  preferred to  unilateral MFN  trade  liberalization.
Indeed, the benefits of greater scale economies might be realized to an equal if not greater extent
under MFN trade liberalization.
In  addition to  achieving cost  reduction  effects related  to  increasing returns  to  scale,
regional integration arrangements might successfully erode market power of dominant firms in
member countries through  encouraging market  entry of competing firms from other  member
countries. This  "pro-competitive" effect is widely cited in popular  discussions of regionalism.
However, the significance of the pro-competitive effect is not assured in recent theoretical studies
that point to other effects that might be offset the pro-competive effect. 42 For instance, a regional
integration  arrangement might result mainly in  shifting production  of  goods  among  member
countries with  little or  no reduction in  market segmentation, and  little or  no  increase in the
number of firms in the trading bloc producing similar products at higher volume and lower profit
margin than attributable to the realization of greater economies of scale.
Also,  offsetting  simultaneous  effects might  occur  even  when  a  regional  integration
arrangement causes segmented regional markets to become fully integrated. If initially segmented
markets are characterized by firms practicing so-called reciprocal dumping of their products  in
foreign markets (financed by higher profits on sales in their domestic market than abroad), then
regional integration arrangements could result in less extensive intra-regional trade than before,
42 See Baldwin and Venables (1995) for extensive and highly technical discussion of this issue.43
lower prices at home for  domestic produced products,  and higher prices abroad for imported
products. In these circumstances, increased competitive condil;ions  within thne  trading bloc could
increase welfare - substantially according to Smith and Venables (1988) - through cost reduction
effects and rationalization of production location, increased sales by domestic firms in domestic
markets, and exit by some if not a substantial number of firms. However, Haaland and Wooton
(1992),  using a general theoretical model, demonstrate that, under  imperfect competition and
increasing returns to  scale with assumed high trade  costs  and  assumed strong preferences  of
consumers for domestic produced goods, regional integratiotn arrangements might lead to very
different results than predicted by "conventional" theoretical and applied models that  emphasize
pro-competitive  effects,  including the  possibility of  prices rising  in  member  countries  with
dominant firms before market integration.
Recent quantitative studies of the Europe  1992 Plan contributed by Smith and Venables
(1988), Gasiorek,  Smith, and Venables (1992), and Harrison, Rutherford, and Tarr (1994) that
apply CGE models of imperfect competition with increasing returns to scale suggest that the pro-
competitive effects of regional integration arrangements might be very substantial for advanced
countries. 43 Nonetheless, in an extensive review of the literature on the  economics of regional
integration arrangements, Baldwin and Venables (1995) conclude that theoretical and empirical
means for  testing  the  overall  significance of  pro-competitive  effects  of  regional  integration
arrangements  have  not  been  fully developed to  date.  Also, the  welfare  effects  of  regional
43  CGE models of imperfect competition  with increasing economies  of scale are seldom applied to regional
integration  arrangements among less developed  countries.  To examine the implications of regional integration
arrangements  among less developed  countries,  investigators  most often  utilize CGE models  of perfect  competition
with constant  returns  to scale,  which tends to limit the magnitude  of weJfare  gains from.  regional trading blocs. A
notable  exception  to this rule  is found  in a series  of  CGE  models  for less  developed  countries  developed  by  de Melo
and Robinson  (1992)  in which changes  in productivity  are assumed  linked  to export  performance.  In these
alternative  models,  welfare  gains  from  regional  integration  for less  developed  countries  are generally  found  to be
dramatically  greater  than in other models  for LDCs.  See,  for instance,  Lewis  and Robinson  (1996).44
integration arrangements on  non-member  countries and the world economy at large under
imperfect  competition  and increasing  returns to scale are not entirely  known  because the rest of
the world is not always  treated fully  in theoretical  and especially  quantitative  models  of imperfect
competition  and regional  integration.
Policy  Guideline  8
Under imperfect  competition  and increasing  returns to scale, a regional  integration arrangement
will  be welfare-improving  in member  countries  only so long as pro-competitive  effects,  including
reduction  in possible  price discrimination  between  markets  by firms,  dominate  tariff revenue  losses
and other possible  welfare-reducing  effects,  and result in substantially  lower prices for domestic
and imported goods as regional  firms expand  their output in response  to increased  demand and
cost reductions from achieving  greater economies  of scale. Whether the regional integration
arrangement  will be beneficial  to the world economy  as a whole will depend on the relative
magnitude  of cost reduction  effects  in member  countries  versus possible  trade suppression  effects
in non-member  countries,  the latter arising  from trade diversion  and reduced  economies  of scale  in
production  by firms  in non-member  countries.
Finally, as noted at the outset of this subsection,  product differentiation  by firms is
commonly  encountered  in markets  characterized  by imperfect  competition.  In theoretical  models,
imperfect  competition can be represented in some appealing  ways, typically  focusing on the
relationship  between  monopolistic  profits  and  the number  of firms  in an industry  producing  similar
products." Specification  of demands  for differentiated  products is necessarily  complex,  and most
often specific functional forms for individual  or community preferences underlying demand
functions  are adopted by economic  theoreticians  and applied  economic  model  builders  in order to
make  their economic  models  more  tractable.  Among  the most popular  functional  forms adopted  is45
the  constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function which conveniently reduces the requisite
number of demand parameters and allows demand for produclts  to be considered as a two-stage
process  in  which  demand for  a  group  of  similar products  vis-a-vis  other  groups  of  similar
products can first be determined, and then demands for indiviclual  products within a given group
of similar products  can be determined on the basis of the  expenditures on the product  group
determined in the first stage and relative prices for similar produicts  within the group.
This two-stage or "separable" demand system is convenient but involves some restrictive
assumptions that may or may not  confound the general findings of econoimic  models involving
imperfect competition and differentiated products. This two-stage demand system has also found
particular popularity in CGE and other quantitative models of international trade in which goods
are assumed differentiable by their  country of origin (under  conditions of  either imperfect or
perfect competition), following Armington (1969). In such models, demands for domestic goods
and demands for competing imports from different countries are assumed separable with the result
that bilateral import demands are typically functions solely of expenditures on imports and relative
prices for similar imported products. However, as contended by Winters (1984a, 1984b, 1985), in
not accounting for prices of competing domestic products and other variables (such as national
income) that  determine  demands for  domestic products,  this  specification of  bilateral import
demands can confound the findings of customs union studies which rely on properly assessing
changes in domestic and foreign prices, and changes in demands for domestic and foreign goods,
to determine the trade and especially welfare effects of regional integration arrangements. 45 Also
44 Firms  also  compete  in terms  of their  variety  of products  in some  modelLs  of imperfect  competition,  giving  rise to
so-called  economies  of scope.  See,  for instance,  Smith  and Venables  (1983).
45 Winters (1984a) reports that empirical tests of the assumption  thalt demand is separable over foreign and
domestic  sources,  using U.K. data on manufacturing  imports and domestic  substitutes  during 1952-79,  find that
separability  of domestic  and imported  goods  in demand  is overwhelmingly  rejected.46
experiments assuming "central" versus "low" values for elasticities of substitution between similar
imports and domestic goods in the Armington demand system conducted recently by Harrison,
Rutherford, and Tarr (1997) using a CGE model for Chile suggest that the common practice of
specifying low values for demand substitution elasticity parameters in CGE models, on the basis
of econometric estimates which are seldom higher than 5-to-10, might bias the simulated impacts
of  regional integration  arrangements on trade  and welfare variables significantly, specifically,
towards concluding that regional integration arrangements among small countries are beneficial. 46
Thus, in assessing the trade and welfare effects of customs unions and free trade areas, the
functional form of demand systems employed in economic models can matter importantly. With
respect to  the  specification of preference or utility functions for  complete demand systems, a
notable development is that investigators using CGE models to  simulate the impacts of regional
integration arrangements, in apparent  acceptance of Winters' objection to  utilizing the popular
Armington demand system in quantitative trade models, have increasingly begun to utilize the so-
called almost ideal demand system (AIDS) developed by Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) which
involves a flexible elasticity of substitution utility function that allows import demand expenditure
elasticities to  differ from unity and cross-country elasticities of substitution to  vary for different
pairs of countries. 47
46 In analyzing  Chile's accession  to Mercosur,  Harrison,  Rutherford,  and Tarr assume central values of 15 and 30
for demand elasticities  of substitution  between  competing  imports  and domestic  goods (upper-level  demand)  and
between competing imports (lower-level  demand) in their model, based on the argument of Reidel (1988) and
Athukorala  and Reidel  (1994)  that, when  international  trade  models  are properly  specified,  demand  substitution
elasticity  estimates  are  not statistically  different  from  infinity  and  the  point  estimates  of models  are in the range  of
15-to-30.  Under the low substitution  elasticity  estimates  commonly  utilized  in CGE models,  small countries
producing  differentiated  products  implicitly  have a greater  measure  of power  to affect  intemational terms of trade
for their  exports.  Thus,  under  regional  integration  arrangements  among  small  countries,  increased  intra-regional
demands  for the goods  produced  by these  countries  imparts  to these  countries  greater  terms  of trade  gains  than if
substitution  elasticities  in the simulation  models  were  set at higher  values.47
Deep Integration
Before  turning  to  the  next  section  examining the  findings of  quantitative studies  of
regional integration  arrangements, this  subsection briefly considers  so-called deep integration,
which is an essential feature of the Europe  1992 Plan and a growing number of other regional
integration arrangements. 48
Two decades ago, Baldwin (1970) observed that as tariff restrictions were gradually being
widely eroded by multilateral trade negotiations, non-tariff barriers were becoming more apparent
and significant as hindrances to trade. Today, non-tariff barriers in turn have, arguably, become
widely eroded,  revealing numerous  administrative and  regulatory  "trade  frictions" restricting
expansion of multilateral and regional trade from within countries rather than at their borders.
These frictions take many forms including customs clearance procedures, product standards and
certification systems, labeling requirements, intellectual property enforcement, direct investment
policies, and prudential supervision and professional licensing systems. In the context of regional
integration arrangements among less developed countries, inadequate or outmoded infrastructure,
including networks of roads, railways, and telecommunication systems, mightc  also be included for
regional improvement or rationalization under  deep integration provisions of modern customs
unions and free trade areas.
Under  the  Europe  1992 Plan,  the  European  Union  has  sought  to  redress  the  deep
integration  problem  by  eliminating  or  harmonizing  differences  in  national  administrative
procedures and product standards. Ex ante quantitative studies of the impacts of the plan using
CGE models of imperfect competition and increasing returns to scale, for instance, contributed by
47 See, for instance, Lewis, Robinson, and Wang (1995).48
Gasiorek, Smith, and Venables (1992), Haaland and Norman (1992), and Harrison, Rutherford,
and Tarr (1994), indicate that, subject to still unresolved questions about appropriate theoretical
models and  quantitative methods  for  determining the  impacts  of  regional  integration  under
imperfect competition (noted previously), deep integration in the European Union will increase
welfare by 1.0-to-2.0 percent of GDP per annum in the major EU countries (France, Germany,
Italy, and the United Kingdom) and by as much as 2.0-to-3.0  percent  of GDP per  annum in
smaller EU countries (e.g., Belgium, Greece, and Ireland).
Today,  regional integration arrangements in  other parts  of the world,  including many
developing areas, are seeking to incorporate policy reforms similar to those  implemented by the
European Union  and  policy reforms  extending to  other  forns  of  deep  integration,  with  the
expectation  that  deep  integration  initiatives will  greatly  facilitate  intra-regional  trade  and
investment. Conceptually, eliminating administrative and  regulatory  trade  frictions  should  be
expected to  reduce  costs  of producing and  distributing traded  goods and,  hence, to  increase
economic welfare through  expansion of  demand in member countries for  regionally-produced
goods. However, some uncertainty surrounds whether deep integration undertaken to harmonize
national  procedures  and  standards,  and  to  improve  regional  social  infrastructure  and
communication networks will spur intra-regional trade significantly  more than inter-regional trade.
Though  this  uncertainty  would  seem  amenable to  analysis using  standard  theoretical  and
quantitative tools of static analysis within either the Viner model or Meade model, no prominent
studies of the economic impacts of deep integration have been undertaken beyond the ex ante
quantitative studies of the aspects of Europe  1992 Plan considered previously, especially in the
48  The issue of deep integration is strongly  associated  with extensive  description  and discussion  of the topic by
Lawrence (1996). Deep integration, however, has  antecedents in  early  analyses of  regional  integration
arrangements  by other  economists,  for example,  Mikesell  (1963).49
context of emerging regional infrastructure development goals of less developed countries in such
regions as South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Eastern and Southern Africa.
5.  Quantitative Studies and Findings
From  its  inception, the  static  theory  of  regional  integration  arrangements  has  been
unsatisfying from a policy making perspective. It has served valuably to  caution policy makers
about the potential pitfalls of entering into economic cooperation agreements to  promote intra-
regional  trade,  investment,  and  even  cross-border  movements  of  labor  and  human  capital.
However, it has not proven useful to  policy makers interested in more precise predictions about
the expected effects of customs unions or free trade areas. The inability of economic theory to
derive firm conclusions regarding the static effects of regional integration arrangements, except
under special circumstances and sometimes restrictive assumptions (albeit, in accordance with the
theory  of  second-best),  has  prompted  the  undertaking  of  quantitative  studies  of  regional
integration arrangements in which the circumstances surrounding individual regional integration
arrangements might be taken into explicit account to yield more definitive answers.
Quantitative  studies  of  regional integration  arrangements may be  classified as  mainly
empirical or  analytical. Empirical  studies  are typically based  on  extensive contemporary  or
historical data,  and  parameters derived from  these data  through  econometric  estimation  and
hypothesis testing. Analytical studies, on the other hand, typically assume an either sectoral or
economywide theoretic  structure,  and  then rely predominantly on  a priori  estimates of  key
parameters compiled from empirical studies that are not necessarily related to  issues raised by
customs unions and free trade  areas. By their nature, empirical studies involve ex post  analysis
involving not  only formally explaining past trends in trade  flows and related variables, such as50
prices and national income, but also specifying  what course - frequently termed the anti-monde -
trade and other variables would have taken had an extant regional integration arrangement not
been established. 49 In ex post  studies, differences between actual data and the anti-monde are
ascribed to the effects of the regional integration arrangement, inclusive of unexplained residuals
or error terms that are the usual by-products of econometric estimation and model simulation (the
so-called residual imputation method). Although they are less frequently encountered, some ex
post  studies employ econometric equations for trade flows (or other variables) to  simulate the
effects of regional integration arrangements through time by changing only values of explanatory
variables directly representing the adoption of regional integration arrangements in the underlying
estimation equations, thereby avoiding imputation of changes in unknown variables or random
factors to  the impacts of the arrangements. In ex ante  studies, on the other  hand, the future
course of variables, with and without a regional integration arrangement, must be judged on the
basis of at least a minimum theoretic structure. 50
Notwithstanding  that  findings of empirical studies might be  preferred over  findings of
analytical studies, today analytical studies employing so-called computable general equilibrium
(CGE) models have gained an upper-hand in popularity if not credence for at least two reasons."
First, with the recent resurgence of interest in regionalisrn, many proposals for new or revitalized
regional integration arrangements have been presented to policy makers and their advisors with
49  It is frequently  assumed  that, in the absence of a regional integration arrangement,  trade patterns between
member countries would have followed pre-arrangement  trends (a time-series approach) or would have been
determined  by the same factors determining  trade between  non-member  countries (a cross-section  approach).  In
more sophisticated econometric-based  analyses, it is typically  assumed that key explanatory variables in an
underlying  estimation  equation  or econometric  model, such as relative  prices in an estimated regression  equation
for member  country  intra-bloc  imports,  would  have  taken on different  values if a regional integration  arrangement
had not been adopted.
50 Mayes (1978,  p. 16) notes that ex post models  themselves  must be partly  analytic  because in specifying  the anti-
monde,  they must provide "an economic  explanation  for the post-integration  situation."51
little possibility for evaluation on the basis of historical data. Anid second, modern CGE models
permit economists increasing latitude to specify and explore the quantitative implications of more
general and  sophisticated behavioral and technical relationship's in  static economic models of
customs unions and free trade areas than have been possible to solve unambiguously in theoretical
models. To be sure, the findings of analytical studies are subject to possibly serious specification
errors, as discussed in Section 4 in connection with differentiated products  and Armington-type
demand  systems, that  should be  acknowledged and  assessed for  any inappropriate  bias,  for
instance, through sensitivity "tests" covering key parameter values and economic relationships in
the underlying analytical models. However, notwithstanding the desirability of undertaking often
more painstaking ex post  empirical analysis, it remains that  the ex ante analytical approach to
evaluating regional  integration  arrangements has  gained considerable currency  during  recent
years.
Problems arise in undertaking a review of quantitative stldies  of customs unions and free
trade areas. Although quantitative studies of regional integration arrangements have traditionally
sought to  measure the benefits of regional trading arrangemecnts  and other  forms of regional
economic cooperation,  these studies - particularly ex post  studies - have not  adhered to  the
norms of any specific theoretical model or framework. Thus, one finds in quantitative studies a
wide variety of economic variables and relationships deemed fundamental to assessing the impact
of the customs unions or free trade areas under study. To be sure, quantitative estimates of trade,
including trade creation and trade diversion, are prominent in these studies. However,  one also
51  On CGE  modeling  and its applications  to international  trade  and development  issues,  see  Dervis,  de Melo,  and
Robinson  (1982),  Shoven  and Whalley  (1984, 1992),  and Robinson  (1989).52
often  finds  other  (mainly economywide) variables emphasized, such  as  real  gross  domestic
product (GDP), wage and exchange rates, and domestic terms of trade. 52
Without  denying other possible choice-variables, including non-economic factors which
have been widely cited as key to understanding the formation and benefits of regional integration
arrangements, 53 the  discussion here takes  a mainly normative view of the benefits of  customs
unions and free trade areas, focusing principally on the findings of quantitative studies regarding
the  impact of  regional  integration  arrangements on  economic welfare.  Unfortunately,  formal
measures derived from the welfare calculus of the theory of tariffs and protection are not always
reported by investigators. Thus, more imprecise measures of welfare effects, typically involving
changes in trade flows and associated measures of trade creation and trade diversion, are also
relied upon in the discussion that follows.
Because a number of extensive and useful reviews of early quantitative studies of regional
integration arrangements have been undertaken previously, 54 the discussion here is devoted mainly
to  examining quantitative studies of regional integration arrangements undertaken  since 1990.
With the  exception of  a  number of  empirical studies  based  on  the  so-called  gravity  model
approach, punctuated recently by the publication of a series of gravity model studies by Frankel
and his  associates  (Frankel 1997a,  1997b), recent  quantitative studies of  new  and  proposed
regional integration arrangements inspired as part of the current resurgence of interest worldwide
52 Though undeniably  important,  the sectoral  implications  of regional integration  arrangements  are beyond more
than occasional  consideration  in the discussion  here of quantitative  studies and their findings. Arguably,  sectoral
impacts of regional  integration arrangements  are especially  important  for the trade and development  prospects  of
less developed  countries.  For instance,  with regard to agriculture  in regional  integration  agreements,  see Burfisher,
Robinson,  and Thierfelder  (1992)  and DeRosa  (1996).
53 See,  Cooper  and Massell  (1965) and Johnson  (1965).
54 See,  for instance,  Mayes (1978),  Robson  (1987),  Pomfret  (1988),  and Baldwin  and Venables  (1995).53
in regionalism have been mainly ex ante analytical studies and, so, form the principal focus of the
discussion here.
The  "1992 Plan"  of  the European  Union (EU)  and  the North  American Free  Trade
Agreement  (Nafta)  have been examined extensively using  applied economic models. Also in
recent years,  a number of current and proposed regional integration arrangements among less
developed countries have been examined using applied economic models, especially for regional
integration  arrangements in Asia and Latin  America. The  discussion here proceeds  first with
consideration of quarititative studies on the European Union  and Nafta, which  are the  largest
regional  integration  arrangements in  terms  of  trade  coverage  and  which  principally involve
advanced  industrial countries.  The  discussion then  considers  quantitative  studies  of  regional
integration arrangements among less developed countries in two  major regions: Asia and Latin
America.
Early Empirical Studies of Regional Integration Arrangements
Before turning to  consider recent ex ante studies, it is instructive to review the principal
findings of early, mainly ex post, studies of regional integration arrangements. Early studies share
the  virtue  of  analyzing actual  data  on  the  experiences of  -regional integration  agreements.
Nonetheless, beyond the fundamental problem discussed previously of defining an anti-monde,
their empirical methods and results are not without question oi  even controversy. For instance,
econometric models of international trade flows have a long history of yielding estimates of price
and substitution elasticities of demand for imports that have been called into question by many
economists for their unexpected low magnitude and frequent statistical insignificance. 55
55 See Prais (1962), Leamer and Stem (1970), and Goldstein and Khan (1985).54
Among the earliest empirical approaches to  assessing the impacts of regional integration
arrangements is  simply investigating intra-regional trade  patterns  in  the  wake  of  forming a
regional trading bloc. Substantial expansion of intra-European Community trade occurred during
the 1960s, when the European Community consisted solely of Belgium, France, Germany, Italy,
Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. Indeed, intra-EC trade as a share of total EC exports increased
from 35 percent in 1960 to 49 percent in 1970. With the expansion of the European Community
in the early 1970s to include Denmark, Portugal, and the United Kingdom, intra-EC trade as a
share of total trade grew much more slowly, from 49 percent in 1975 to  52 percent in 1981. As
noted  previously and  discussed further below,  empirical investigators have  also  reported  the
emergence and growth of intra-industry trade in the wake of the EC's formation and expansion.
In contrast, early investigators of regional integration arrangements among less developed
countries frequently found the growth of intra-bloc trade lacking. They attribute this finding to
not only fundamental factors such as similarity of resource endowments of neighboring countries
but also frequent failure of less developed countries to implement fully the terms of their regional
integration agreements - and sometimes even deliberate undermining of their regional integration
agreements, for instance, by adopting new nontariff barriers on imports from all (member and
non-member) countries. In Southeast Asia, the early preferential trading arrangement among the
Association  of  Southeast  Asian Nations  (Asean) - the  so-called  Asean  PTA  - was  widely
reported after its first decade to have failed to increase intra-bloc trade much above its traditional
level of 15-to-20 percent of total Asean trade.  56 And, in Latin America where regional integration
arrangements among less developed countries have their longest history and were clearly adopted
to  promote  import  substitution  on  a  region-wide basis, expansion of  intra-regional  trade  in
56 See,  for instance,  Naya and Plummer  (1991).55
manufactures and all goods failed to match the expansion of intra-regional trade in the European
Community or the  outward-oriented East  Asian newly industrialized countries  (Korea,  Hong
Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan). For instance, as reported by Nogues and Quintanilla (1993), while
intra-regional trade in manufactures during 1965-90 by the outward-oriented Asian NICs  grew
from 2.0 percent of GDP to  6.9 percent of GDP, intra-regional trade in manufactures during the
same period by the Andean Pact countries 57 grew from 0.1 percent of GDP to only 0.6 percent of
GDP.
More sophisticated early empirical studies of regional integration arrangements focused on
the impacts on European Community trade, particularly EC trade in manufactures, after the Rome
Treaty of 1957, using a variety of ex post  approaches. 58 The mnost  ambitious and successfiul  of
these early empirical studies - studies by Truman (1969) and Prewo (1974) using trade  share
measures, Balassa (1967,  1975) using income elasticities of demand for imports and the novel
assumption that  higher (lower) income  elasticity values imply trade  creation (diversion), and
Aitken (1973) using the gravity model approach explaining bilateral trade flows econometrically
by,  among other variables, transportation  costs,  income levels between  trading  partners,  and
institutional factors  such as the formation of regional trading blocs - sought to  estimate trade
diversion as well as trade creation. Despite their different approaches, these early empirical studies
found  that,  following creation  of  the  European  Community, trade  creation  in  manufactures
significantly outweighed trade  diversion in manufactures. Moreover,  they also generally found
that formation of the European Community led to significant expansion of manufacturing exports
57 Bolivia,  Chile,  Colombia,  Ecuador,  Peru,  and Venezuela.  Chile  left  the Aidean  Pact  in 1976.
58 Ex ante studies  of the European  Community  were  also undertaken  at an early  date, ite most prominent  by
Scitovsky  (1958),  Verdoorn  (1960),  and Balassa  (1962).  For extensive  discussion  of early  ex post studies  of the
European  Community,  see Balassa (1975)  and Mayes  (1978).  The discussion  here draws on more recent
discussions  by  Robson  (1987)  and  Pomfret  (1988).56
to EC countries by non-member countries. The significant expansion of manufacturing exports to
EC  countries  is  most  often interpreted  as  reflecting liberalization and  rationalization  of  EC
external tariffs under the Rome Treaty. In sum, early empirical studies found that the European
Community was trade-creating on a net basis for not only the new trading bloc but also the world
economy.
Balassa (1975) went beyond estimating the impacts of the European Community on trade,
namely, to consider the impact of the new regional integration arrangement on EC welfare. Using
the average EC tariff rate for manufactures and his own estimate of trade creation for  1970, he
calculated that EC welfare was improved by $0.7 billion per annum, or 0.15 percent of EC GDP
per  annum. Additionally, he  considered the  economic cost  of  trade  diversion under  the EC
Common Agricultural Policy, which he calculated at  $0.3-to-0.4  billion per  annum. Thus, he
arrived at a net welfare gain for the EC customs union of $0.4 billion per annum, or less than one-
tenth of one percent of EC GDP per annum. 59
Finally, some early empirical studies sought to quantify the impacts of the new European
Community on  other  variables,  including the  distribution  of  gains  in  trade  among  member
countries. Two empirical studies stand out because of later quantitative studies on the European
Union and  other regional integration arrangements among advanced countries spawned by the
two early EC studies. The first study is by Balassa (1966). Balassa reported that  expansion of
trade under the EC customs union was composed importantly of intra-industry trade rather than
inter-industry trade, suggesting that increasing returns to  scale in production by individual firms
was a  significant factor underlying competition among firms in Western Europe  and advanced
59 No early empirical investigators sought to quantify the economic costs or benefits of the European  Community
for non-member countries (with the possible exception of the EFTA countries).  In particular, the apparent  benefit57
countries in other regions and, as such, could be the source of substantial (additional) gains from
regional integration under the European Community. The second study is by Owen (1983). Owen
provided empirical estimates of the significance  of scale economnies  for some major EC industries
(mainly appliances, autos, and other roadway vehicles). Based on his finding of substantial scale
economies in the industries considered, Owen concluded that, if his estimates are applicable to all
EC manufacturing, the cost reduction effects from achieving greater  economies of scale under
regional integration in Western Europe might have amounted to  3-to-6  percent of EC  GDP in
1980.
to non-member countries of the expansion of their exports to EC countries was not examined against the possibility
of simultaneous adverse terms of trade changes.58
Regional Integration Arrangements among Advanced Countries
Broadly speaking, the most  sophisticated CGE models have been applied to  analyzing
regional integration arrangements among the countries forming the present day European Union
and new North American Free Trade Agreement. In particular, reflecting the advent of imperfect
competition theory applied to inter-industry trade among advanced countries such as the United
States, Germany, and Japan, these models frequently assume the existence of imperfect markets in
which prices are set above both marginal and average costs, typically in the presence of increasing
returns  to  scale (as presaged by the  empirical findings of Balassa (1966) and  Owen (1983)).
Among  other  features,  not  necessarily exclusive to  regional integration  arrangements  among
advanced countries, these models also widely feature demands for goods used as intermediate
factors  of  production  and  considerable disaggregation  of  not  only  intermediate  and  final
consumption goods but also primary factors of production. Finally, it should be emphasized that,
in contrast to the assumption of homogeneous goods in the Vinerian and Meade models, virtually
all modem CGE models assume that consumers differentiate similar products by country of origin
and sometimes (in imperfect competition models) by producing firms. Under conditions of either
perfect  competition  or  imperfect  competition  between  firms,  the  assumption  of  products
differentiated by country  (or  firm) ascribes to  each trading country,  both  large  and  small, a
measure  of  market  power  in  the  global  economy  (ultimately determined  by  the  effective
magnitude of  demand  substitution elasticities facing country-specific products  worldwide)  to
affect the terms of trade for a country's exports by means of not only direct taxes or controls on
exports but also protection measures such as import tariffs and quantitative restrictions. 60
6 0 Protection  measures,  including  nontariff  barriers  to imports,  affect  the terns of trade of a country's  differentiated
exports  by the so-called  Lerner symmetry  theorem  which  demonstrates  that protection  measures  restricting  imports
are equivalent  to a tax on exports.  See  Lerner (1936).59
European Union
The European Union and its antecedents in the European Coal and Steel Community and
European  Community hold  considerable pride  of place  in  discussions of regional  integration
arrangements, and,  as discussed previously, the European Community has been the subject of
many quantitative studies,  both  ex  post  and  ex  ante. 6"  Notwithstanding  long-standing issues
concerning expansion of membership of the European Union, 62 the primary issue surrounding the
European Union most recently has been the trade and welfare 'implications  of the so-called 1992
Plan under which deepening of economic integration in the European Union is to be accomplished
by adoption of common product standards and elimination of other "trade costs" represented by
not  only import restrictions  but  also  national industrial and  commercial regulations hindering
complete integration of markets for goods and services in the European Union.
The results found by three prominent quantitative stuclies of this issue are presented in
Table  3.  These  studies  consider  the  implications  of  reducing  intra-union  trade  costs  for
manufactures by 2.5 percent,  in principle enabling EU firms producing differentiated products
under  imperfect competition to  expand output  and reduce  costs along declining average  cost
schedules. The studies by Gaiorek, Smith, and Venables (1992) and Haaland and Norman (1992)
are both  based  on an  analytical model of imperfect competition in the European  Community
developed by Smith and Venables (1988). Furthermore, both studies consider the implications of
complete market integration in the European Union, in which EU firms do not set different prices
for the same product in different member countries. The third study by Harrison, Rutherford, and
Tarr (1994) employs a somewhat more extensive and sophisticated model that does not impose
61 Analyses  by Sapir (1992)  and Winters  (1993)  are among  the more  recent  general  discussions  of issues  and
quantitative analyses of economic integration under the European Communities and European Union.60
uniform pricing by firms across EU markets. Instead, the investigators in the third study represent
standardization of products under the 1992 Plan by substantially  increasing values of substitution
elasticities of demand in EU countries to reflect significantly  increased possibilities for substitution
in demand in member country markets for similar products produced by competing EU firms.
The quantitative results indicate that deepening of economic integration in the European
Union should be  expected to  achieve substantial economic gains, on the order of  1 percent  of
GDP per  annum in several EU countries,  owing predominantly to  pro-competitive effects of
product standardization (with increasing returns to scale).
The results also  suggest the  occurrence of appreciable trade  diversion under  the  1992
Plan, possibly limiting gains in welfare in the European Union and possibly contributing to losses
in welfare in other parts of the world. Indeed, given the large size of the European Union, the pro-
competitive effects of the 1992 plan might be expected to have spillover effects on firms in non-
member countries and  even firms within the European Union. Details  of the  CGE  simulation
results  do indicate that  considerable rationalization of production occurs  within the European
Union, with large numbers of EU firms forced to shut down in the face of declining terms of trade
(and profit margins). However, the "evidence"  from the model simulations indicates that, although
similar pro-competitive pressures must rebound on non-member country firms, spillover effects on
economic welfare  are negative and  arguably appreciable for  the  European  Free  Trade  Area
(EFTA) countries (-0.10 percent of GDP per annum), and negative and insignificant  for Japan and
the United States (-0.01 percent of GDP per annum). 63
62 Greece  acceded  to the European  Community  in 1980,  followed  by Spain and Portugal  in 1986.  On possible
future  expansion  of the  European  Union  to include  Eastern  European  countries,  see  for  instance  Baldwin  (1994).
63 See  quantitative  results  for Haaland  and  Norman  (1992)  in Table  3. After  a span  of 10  years,  the impact  on the
EFTA  countries  would  be an accumulated  1 percent  of GDP,  while  the impact  on Japan  and the United  States
would  be an accumulated  0.  1 percent  of  GDP.61
North  American  Free Trade  Agreement
The North  American Free Trade Agreement, adopted  in 1992, is an outgrowth  of the
1988 Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement (and earlier Canada-U.S. trade cooperation
pacts), 64 extended to include Mexico as part of Mexico's program of extensive economic reforms
begun  during the late-1980s. Nafta is remarkable for not only its shared preeminence with the
European  Union as a regional integration arrangement but also its inclusion of both  advanced
countries (Canada and the United States) and less developed countries (Mexico currently, but also
possibly Chile and Mercosur countries in the future).
Representative  of  recent  ex  ante  quantitative studies  of  Nafta  are the  three  studies
presented in Table 4. Like the previous studies of the 1992 Plan for the European Union, the two
studies by Brown, Deardorff, and  Stern (1992) and Roland-Horst, Reinert,  and Shiells (1992)
involve CGE models incorporating imperfect competition and increasing returns  to  scale. The
Brown,  Deardorff,  and  Stern  model  assumes  firms  set  prices  above  average  cost  (though
monopolistic profits  are eventually bid away by entry of new firms), while the Roland-Horst,
Reinert,  and  Shiells model  assumes firms set  prices  at  average  cost  following the  so-called
contestable market  theory  (with no  entry or  exit by firms). T'he third study by Bachrach  and
Mizrahi (1992) involves a more simply specified model, namely, one assuming perfect competition
and constant returns to scale in production. 65
64 Quantitative  analysis of trade cooperation  pacts between Canada and the United States dates to the seminal
contribution  of Wonnacott  and Wonnacott  (1967), which notably  was among the earliest quantitative studies  to
investigate and  show the importance of increasing returns to scale to trade and welfare effects of regional
integration  arrangements.
65  Judging by the discussion  of recent CGE models of regional integration arrangements  among less developed
countries discussed further below in this section, the specifications  of the Bachrach-Mizrahi  model might be
considered  appropriate  for Mexico  but less so for Canada  and the United  States. Nonetheless,  the results found by62
All three studies find that Nafta provides positive gains to  member countries. However,
the variation in simulated economic gains is wide, with the smallest gains found by the Bachrach
and Mizrahi model  (gains range from  insignificant for Canada and the  United States to  0.32
percent of GDP per annum for Mexico) and the largest gains found by the Roland-Horst, Reinert,
and Shiells model (gains range from 2-to-3 percent of GDP per annum for the United States and
Mexico, respectively, to 10.57 percent of GDP per annum for Canada).
As might be expected, the largest proportionate gains tend to be found for Mexico, which
is essentially a small country that gains access to two large markets for its exports of agricultural
products and labor-intensive manufactures (formerly covered by extensive administered controls
in Canada and the United States). Thus, liberalizing  Mexico's trade regime vis-a-vis Canada and
the United States arguably approximates liberalizing  Mexico's trade regime vis-a-vis the world at
large. Indeed, according to the simulation results, Nafta would appear to  stimulate rather than
repress imports from non-member countries, presumably because of strong positive income and
welfare effects. 66
The simulation results for the United States, which is essentially a large country forming a
trading bloc with two  much smaller trading partners, indicate that appreciable if not  significant
trade  diversion occurs in connection with U.S. imports from non-member countries. However,
this trade  diversion is apparently not  sufficiently large to  negatively impact the  overall U.S.
economy. Moreover, at least in the case of the simulation results found by Roland-Horst, Reinert,
and Shiells, assumed "protective" pricing by monopolistic U.S. firms in contestable markets, in
the Bachrach-Mizrahi model provide an (imprecise)  yardstick for the importance of the  more sophisticated
technical  and  behavioral  relationships  specified  in the  two  alternative  models  of  Nafta  considered  here.
"  As the  notes  in Table  4 indicate,  still  larger  trade  and welfare  effects  are  found  for Mexico  (and  United  States)  if
other  terms  of Mexico's  accession  to Nafta  are represented  in the CGE  model  simulations.  These  terms include
especially  liberalization  of  Mexico's  policies  governing  inward  foreign  direct  investment.63
conjunction with  scale economy effects, magnify the pro-competitive effects of Nafta  on both
trade and welfare found by Brown, Deardorff, and Stern, who assume the traditional (Cournot-
type) specification of monopolistic pricing following  the approach of the three quantitative studies
of the EU 1992 Plan highlighted  in Table 3.
Finally, only the  simulation results of the Brown, Deardorff, and  Stern  model provide
explicit indication of possible spillover effects of Nafta on third-countries. Specifically,  the Brown,
Deardorff, and Stern model results indicate that, although substantial diversion of trade with non-
menmber  countries might occur, the impact on welfare in the rest of the world is unlikely to  be
appreciable. Given, however, the limited (reported) disaggregation of trade and welfare effects on
third-countries  in  the  simulation results  of  the  Brown,  Deardorff,  and  Stern  model  and
considerations for basic trade theory, the possibility of significant negative impacts on particular
individual non-member countries should not be discounted. Strong possibilities in this regard are
Caribbean and Central American countries, and even some East Asian countries, whose exports of
agricultural  products  and  especially labor-intensive manufactures might  be  supplanted under
Nafta.
Whether such third-countries will be adversely affected by Nafta will depend on the nature
of their recourse to  alternative world markets, as discussed recently by Leamer et al. (1995) for
the case of Central American countries whose exports of apparel and other labor-intensive goods
to  the United  States are expected to  be  supplanted by expansion of  competing exports  from
Mexico under Nafta. Using an applied partial equilibrium mocLel,  notably, assuming homogeneous
rather than differentiated products,  Leamer and  his associal:es point to  the possibility that  the
Central American countries might make up for lost exports to the United States by increasing
their exports to Mexico. Specifically, they contend that, depending upon the openness, size, and64
capacity of the Mexican economy to redirect domestic output and expand exports to the United
States (creating increased demands for imports of both intermediate goods and consumer goods),
Mexico's neighboring Central American countries might not lose under Nafta. Indeed, bolstered
by the  simulation results  of their model, Leamer and his associates conclude that,  so long  as
Mexico maintains a relatively open economy admitting unfettered imports and ensuring growth of
the Mexican economy to  a "large" size, and so long as both production and distribution of goods
in the Central American countries are sufficiently  flexible to redirect exports from U. S. markets to
Mexican markets, the Central American countries might count on enjoying appreciable economic
gains as a result of Nafta. 7
Regional Integration Arrangements among LDCs
Although advanced countries have arguably taken primary leadership in adopting regional
integration arrangements during the current resurgence of regionalism, less developed countries
have also actively formulated and  begun to  implement plans  for  new  or  revitalized regional
integration arrangements, despite their past failure and disappointment at early regional and even
global agreements for economic cooperation among LDCs. 68 Countries in Asia and Latin America
have  made  the  greatest  progress  in  designing and  implementing pacts  for  regional  trade
cooperation. However, important proposals for adopting customs unions, free trade  areas, and
other  regional trading  arrangements are under  discussion or  study in other  major  developing
67 An important corollary  of the Leamer et al. findings is that the U.S. effective  tariff is reduced to zero in a
number  of product categories  as Mexican  exports  to the United States,  combined  with increased  Mexican  imports
from Central America  and other  third-countries,  effectively  reducing  U.S. domestic  prices in the product  categories
affected  to world levels.
6S For a general discussion  of past experiences  of LDCs with regional cooperation  agreements,  see Langhammer
and Hiemenz  (1990).  Also see the series  of regional  perspectives  on regional  integration  arrangements  in de Melo
and Panagariya  (1993).65
regions, including the Middle East and North  Africa, which has also begun to  initiate bilateral
"hub-and-spoke" trading accords with the European Union under the EU's Mediterranean Free
Trade Initiative, and Sub-Saharan Africa. 69
Recent  quantitative studies of regional integration arrangements among less developed
countries undertaken using CGE models differ in important respects from the previously reviewed
quantitative  studies  of  regional  integration  arrangements  among  advanced  countries.  Most
important,  quantitative  studies  of  regional  integration  arrangements  among LDCs  generally
assume  perfect  competition  among firms  and  constant  returns  to  scale  in  production.  This
"paradigm  shift"  mirrors  the  stylized  view  of  firms  in  less  developed  countries  as  being
predominantly producers of mainly traditional commodities and labor-intensive manufactures that
are produced using widely available ("off-the-shelf') technologies and sold chiefly in competitive
domestic and foreign markets. 70 Notwithstanding this paradigm shift, CGE models employed to
investigate regional integration arrangements among LDCs commonly adopt the assumption that
consumers  in  trading  countries  differentiate  similar  prodtucts according  to  their  place  of
production. However, perhaps reflecting recent evolution of economic modeling techniques, the
CGE models for less developed countries reviewed here involve specification of the almost ideal
demand system (AIDS) formulated by Deaton and Muellbauer (1980), which, unlike the constant
elasticity of substitution utility functions in the Armington (1969) demand system (used widely in
the CGE models of regional integration among advanced countries reviewed previously), allows
69 On the EU's Mediterranean  Free Trade Initiative  and its implications  for countries  in the Middle East and North
Africa,  see Hoekman  and Djankov  (1996)  and Galal and Hoekman  (1997).  For a recent discussion  of prospects  for
regional  integration  in Sub-Saharan  Africa,  see Oyejide,  Elbadawi,  and Collier  (1997).
70  In the modem global economy,  these characterizations  of less developed countries might be challenged on
several  counts.  Also, in multi-country  CGE models  in which  both advanced  countries  and less developed  countries
are included, firms and consumers in both types of countries are typically  modeled in the same way, that is,
adopting  the stylized  assumptions  of perfect  competition  and constant  returns  to scale  for all countries.66
expenditure  elasticities  for imports and domestic substitutes to  differ from unity and demand
substitution  elasticities  to vary for different  pairs of countries.  Finally, although  economies  of
scale do not feature prominently  in recent quantitative  studies of customs  unions and free trade
areas among  less developed  countries,  some  investigators  have incorporated  relationships  linking
sectoral and economywide  productivity  changes  to export performance  in their models  with the
result that,  not unlike incorporating increasing  returns to  scale in  CGE models, one  finds
substantially  greater gains in trade and economic  welfare  from trade liberalization  on not only a
preferential  basis  but also a nondiscriminatory  basis. 7
Asia
Asean Free  Trade Area. The Association  of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) is the
longest-established  regional group for economic (and political) cooperation  within Asia. The
association  also holds legitimate  claim to being the first if not most prominent  group of less
developed  countries  worldwide  to formulate  and implement  a regional  free trade area under the
current  resurgence  of regionalism,  the Asean  Free Trade Area (Afta),  which  was adopted in 1992
and will  be implemented  fillly  by 2003.
Several  studies  have  examined  Afta,  but few studies  have  given  it extensive  or very serious
quantitative  representation.  Two recent exceptions  are studies  by DeRosa (1995) and Lewis and
Robinson  (1996), whose findings  are summarized  in Table 5. Both studies  find that Afta is trade-
creating  on a net basis. The larger gains  in trade and marginally  larger gains  in welfare  found by
DeRosa  are attributable  in part to the differences  in base periods and simulation  scenarios  between
7  See de Melo and Robinson (1992) for a general discussion  of productivity  changes in models of export-led
growth.67
the  two  studies. Whereas DeRosa  employs pre-Uruguay Round levels of tariff  and  nontariff
protection and does not take into account liberalization  by the Asean countries under the Uruguay
Round,  Lewis  and  Robinson  take  into  account  the  outcomne of  the  last  multilateral  trade
negotiations before simulating the incremental quantitative imapacts  of Afta. Nonetheless, both
studies  find that  Afta  contributes  comparatively little to  higher economic welfare  in  Asean
countries,  except  possibly  the  two  highest-income and  particularly  open  Asean  countries,
Malaysia and  Singapore.  This  seems  counterintuitive in  light of  the  static  economic theory
reviewed  in  section  3  which  found  that  relatively open  economies  should  be  expected  to
experience limited if  not  negative gains from regional integiration arrangements. However,  as
DeRosa explains, both Malaysia and Singapore benefit principally from the diversion of trade by
other Asean countries. The two  countries supply the largest proportion of the increased intra-
regional demand for manufactures previously supplied by advanced countries outside the region.
And, owing to  its especially open economy (and real exchange rate appreciation under  Afta 72),
Singapore expands  its  consumption possibilities and gains from  trade  with  not  only  member
countries but  also countries outside Southeast Asia (i.e., no  effective diversion of  Singapore's
trade occurs).
The Lewis-Robinson model incorporates the AIDs demand system and fully endogenous
models for other Asian countries (including Japan), the European Union, and United States. The
precise  implications of  assuming a  more  flexible demand  system are  not  apparent  from  the
72  Though  endogenous  exchange  rates are a feature  of most applied  international  trade models  today,  few
quantitative studies of regional integration arrangements highlight the role of exchange rate adjustment in
simulation  results.  When countries  joining customs  unions or free trade areas  benefit  substantially  from expansion
of their imports arising from trade creation, exchange  rate depreciation  often plays an appreciable  enabling  role.
Alternatively,  when member countries, such as Singapore  in Afta, benefit substantially  from expansion of their
exports  arising from trade diversion  in other member  countries,  exchange  rate appreciation  often  plays an enabling
role in the adjustment  to a new external (and domestic)  equilibrium.68
simulation results  in  Table  5. However,  it is  apparent that  the  model finds little by  way  of
significant  international spillover effects emanating from formation of Afta.
Finally, both DeRosa and Lewis and Robinson report that alternative scenarios in which
the trade regimes of the Asean countries are liberalized on  a concerted MFN basis rather than
preferential basis yield substantially larger gains in trade and economic welfare. This finding is
consistent with the pure static theory of customs unions and free trade areas. In the context of the
"mnissing  foreign tariffs"  theory  of  customs  unions  advanced by  Wonnacott  and  Wonnacott
(1981), this finding also suggests that foreign levels of protection facing Asean exports are not so
high as to provide the new Asean Free Trade Area with opportunities for economic gains through
preferencial trade liberalization that are greater than those  available to Asean countries through
concerted if not unilateral MIFN  trade liberalization. 73
Asia-Pacific  Free Trade Area.  During the last two  decades, trade  and growth  in the
Asia-Pacific region have come to rival trade and growth in the North Atlantic region formed by
Canada, the European Union, and United States. In recent years, less developed countries in the
Asia-Pacific region have also joined with advanced countries in the region, including Japan and
the United States, to  form the Asia-Pacific Econornic Cooperation  (Apec) Forum. This group
consists mostly of relatively open  economies. However, not  withstanding the current  financial
crisis in Asia, Apec is considering proposals to  establish an Asia-Pacific free trade  area. 74 Pure
73 Essentially  this conclusion  follows  from  the  fact  that,  despite  significant  advances  in trade  liberalization  in many
if not most  developing  countries  during  the last  decade  or more,  protection  levels  remain  higher  on average  in less
developed  countries  than in advanced  countries. It is also important  to recognize  that simulations  of many CGE
models, even though they may not be truly global models, are explicitly  contingent upon protection levels in
foreign countries  as well as the countries  that are the primary  focus  of the models.  Thus, in both the DeRosa  study
and the Lewis-Robinson  study, protection  levels in not only the Asean.  countries but also foreign countries are
taken into account.
74 See Apec (1993, 1994)  and Bergsten  (1997).69
trade theory and the policy guidelines derived previously fronn the Vinerian and Meade models
present conflicting views of the prospects of an Asia-Pacific free trade area. On the one hand, the
size and diversity of the Apec countries suggest that  an Asia-Pacific free trade  area would be
strongly trade-creating. On the other hand, the relative openness of the Apec countries suggests
that  net  economic gains under  an Asia-Pacific free trade  area might be  elusive because tariff
revenue losses from diversion of trade with major trading part:ners in Western Europe and other
regions, such as Latin America, South Asia, and the Middle East, could be more substantial than
the magnitude of possible production-related or consumption-related gains in economic welfare,
including for low-to-middle-income Apec countries such as the Asean-4 countries.
Lewis, Robinson, and Wang (1995) investigate the qutantitative  implications of an Asia-
Pacific free trade area using a model similar to that employed by Lewis and Robinson (1995) to
analyze Afta. The hypothetical free trade area is found to be trade-creating, in the aggregate and
for individual Apec countries. Only in the case of the United St:ates  does trade diversion appear to
be substantial, amounting to  nearly 70 percent of the total  increase in U.S.  imports. It  is also
notable that trade diversion attributable to the free trade area falls to the greatest extent, over $26
billion per annum at 1989 prices, on developing countries outside the Asia-Pacific region rather
than the European Union.
Despite the size and diversity of the Asia-Pacific regio:n,  few countries are found to enjoy
substantial gains in economic welfare, including the United States and China. Only welfare in the
East Asian NIEs (Hong Kong, Korea, and Taiwan) and Japan is significantly improved, by about
2.5 percent and 1.0 percent respectively. The significant  gains by Japan and East Asian NlEs may70
reflect improved access to markets in the United States where protection is widely reported to be
targeted on imports from particularly Japan and other high-income  East Asian countries. 75
Further, the quantitative results provided by Lewis and.  his associates would seem to deny
the  hypothesis  discussed in  Section 3  that  small countries,  such  as the  Asean-4 (Indonesia,
Malaysia, Phlilippines, and  Thailand), might expect  to  gain  considerably from joining  a  large
trading bloc such as the hypothetical Asia-Pacific free trade area. Indeed, the quantitative results
indicate that the four Asean countries would enjoy welfare gains of less than 0.5 percent, 76 unless
the improvement in their export performance is assumed to  induce productivity gains in which
case the four Asean countries might enjoy welfare gains of more than 4.0 percent  according to
Lewis et al. 77
Latin America and Greater Western HemisDhere
Nafta has aroused the interest of policy makers throughout the Western Hemisphere and
especially Latin America. Fearing that access of exports to markets in Nafta countries, especially
the United States, will be significantly  diminished, policy makers in Latin America are particularly
interested in the possibility of other Western Hemisphere countries joining Nafta,  a possibility
raised in the Nafta agreement itself and discussed most often in terms of accession to  Nafta by
7  The extent to which protection  statistics employed  by Lewis,  Robinson,  and Wang reflect U.S. targeting of
protection  measures  against imports  from high-income  East Asian  countries  is uncertain.
76 It is tempting to compare  the welfare  effect  of the Asia-Pacific  free trade area for the Asean4 found by Lewis,
Robinson,  and Wang (1995) to the welfare  effect of Afta for the Asean countries found by DeRosa (1995) and
Lewis and Robinson (1996). Unfortunately,  such comparisons  are hindered  by, in addition to differences  in the
specifications  of the underlying  CGE models,  differences  in the measurement  of welfare  changes and differences  in
the simulation  base year. Were it possible  to identify  the Asean4 countries individually  in the Lewis-Robinson-
Wang model, an appropriate  "test" of the hypothesis  that small countries gain more from accession  to a large
trading bloc than a small trading bloc  would  be a comparison  of the magnitude of the welfare gains found  by the
Lewis-Robinson-Wang  model  for the Asean-4  countries  under Afta  versus  under the Asia-Pacific  free trade area.71
Chile. Policy makers in  Latin America are also  interested in the  implications of  sub-regional
integration arrangements in the Western Hemisphere, includingr  possible intlerlocking hub-and-
spoke  trading arrangements. 78 Finally, agreement in principle reached by Western Hemisphere
countries in 1994 to establish the Free Trade Area of the Americas (Ftaa) by the year 2005 raises
questions about the possible global effects of regional integration arrangements in the Western
Hemisphere.
Greater  Nafta.  Among  other  possibilities, Nafta  might  be  expanded  to  include the
countries of the Caribbean and Central America, in effect, forming a greater North American free
trade  area (Gnafta). Gnafta is investigated in an ex ante study by Hinojosa-Ojeda, Lewis,  and
Robinson (1995)  using  an  early model  of  Nafta  crafted  to  focus  on  agricultural  and  labor
mnigration  issues. 79 The results of the study, presented in panel  1 of Table 6, indicate that  the
countries forming Gnafta would enjoy appreciable gains in trade  but  not welfare. In terms of
welfare, the United States and Central America do not achieve appreciable gains at all, while the
Caribbean countries and Mexico achieve gains in welfare amounting to less than 0.25 percent of
GDP per annum. The reasons for this outcome are not  clear, except in the case of the United
States whose economy is too large to be significantly  affected by Gnafta!s formation and possibly
in the  case  of Mexico whose increase in imports under  the hypothetical regional  integration
arrangement  is  accompanied  by  substantial trade  diversion. For  the  Caribbean  and  Central
American countries, trade diversion is much less appreciable (relative to total increased imports),
77 Under the assumption of trade-productivity linkages, gains in economic welfare for other countries in the Lewis,
Robinson, Wang study are  less dramatic.  The increase in real absorption rises to 3.1  percent  in the East  Asian
NIEs, 2.0 percent in China, and 1.3 percent in Japan. For the United States, it rises to only 0.2 percent.
'8 See, for instance, Wonnacott (1996) and Wonnacott and Wonnacott (1996).
79 See Hinojosa4Ojeda and Robinson (1992) and Robinson et al. (1993).72
and exports expand significantly. Nonetheless, only in simulations of the Hinojosa-Ojeda et al.
model in which productivity gains are linked to improved export performance, termed "dynamic"
simulations by the  study investigators, do the Caribbean and Central American countries (and
Mexico) achieve significant gains in welfare under Gnafta, specifically, welfare gains in the range
of 3-to-5 percent of GDP per annum.0
Mercosur. Countries of the Southern Cone of Latin America have embraced regionalism
more actively than countries in Central America and the Caribbean. This applies particularly to
member  countries  of the  South American Common Market  (Mercosur)  - Argentina, Brazil,
Paraguay, and Uruguay - which was established as a customs union in 1991 and, in recent years,
has achieved significant reduction if not complete elimination of tariffs and nontariff barriers to
intra-Mercosur trade.
One quantitative study of Mecrosur  that has engendered  a great  deal of  interest,  and
debate, is a (rare) ex post study of the new regional integration arrangement undertaken by Yeats
(1997). Rather than assessing trade creation and diversion, and their net welfare impacts, Yeats
investigates whether recent  commodity patterns of exports by Mercosur countries  to  different
destinations conform to the past revealed comparative advantage of Mercosur countries in natural
resource-intensive and labor-intensive goods. He finds that the fastest growing products in intra-
Mercosur  trade  are capital-intensive goods in which Mercosur  countries  have not  previously
displayed strong export performance. Thus, the Yeats study suggests that the new patterns of
80 Additional  scenarios  investigating  the implications  of hub-and-spoke  trading arrangements  with Mexico  and the
United States serving alternatively  as the hub-country  find that gains to the two hub-countries  are higher than
under Nafta but not Gnafta. Also,  under the hypothetical  hub-and-spoke  arrangements,  the Caribbean  and Central
American  countries  benefit  most from trading arrangements  featuring  the United States  as the hub-country  because
of greater  benefits  from duty-free  access  to the U.S.  market  than from duty-free  access  to the Mexican  market.73
trade by Mercosur countries, which are at odds with what their historical comparative advantage
would predict (the anti-monde in the Yeats study), are indicative of possible adverse effects of
Mercosur on member countries and the world at large.
Another recent study of Mercosur that does not rely on CGE modeling is an ex ante study
of the significance of geographic proximity among member countries for intra-regional trade and
economic welfare by Amjadi and Winters (1997). This study explores whether the Wonnacott
hypothesis (Wonnacott and Wonnacott 1981, 1992) that regional integration arrangements offer
member countries opportunities for enjoying economic gains from avoiding trade-costs with third-
countries  is  applicable  to  Mercosur.  Specifically, Amjadi  and  Winters  investigate  whether
transportation  costs between Mercosur countries and the rest of the world (represented by the
United  States)  are  sufficiently high  to  afford  significant gains  to  Mercosur  countries  from,
adopting  preferential  trade  with  one  another.  Amjadi and  Winters  find  that  extra-regional
transportation  costs are appreciably higher than intra-regional transportation  costs but that  the
margin between the two  costs is not  large  enough per  se to  yield substantial gains with the
introduction of trade preferences among Mercosur countries.
Two  recent  ex ante studies of Mercosur using CGE  models, by Flores (1997)  and by
Hinojosa-Ojeda, Lewis, and Robinson (1997), provide, arguably, a more encompassing view of
the  expected effects on trade  and welfare of the new regional integration arrangement in the
Southern Cone. 8 '
81  It has been suggested  the results  found  by Yeats (1997) are partial equilibrium  in nature, whereas results  found
by CGE models  of Mercosur  are superior  if not more  reliable  because  of their general equilibrium  character.  As ex
post results,  however,  the Yeats results are the outcome  of a general equilibrium  process (whatever  the precise
elements  of that process might be), whereas CGE model results, while they may be more  encompassing  in the
sense of yielding formal results for overall  changes in trade and economnic  welfare,  are ex ante in character and
therefore  without  empirical  verification.74
The Flores model is patterned after the model of imperfect competition with increasing
returns to scale employed by Gasiorek, Smith, and Venables (1992) to investigate the 1992 Plan
for the European Union. The Hinojosa-Ojeda, Lewis, and Robinson model, on the other hand, is
an updated  and enlarged version of the model of perfect competition under constant returns to
scale employed by the three collaborators to  investigate the effects of the hypothetical Gnafta.
The simulated trade and welfare effects found using the two models are presented in panels 2 and
3, respectively, of Table 6.
The  simulation results  reveal  sharp  differences in  economic effects between  the  two
models. Both models "predict" Mercosur will be trade-creating - notably, without  even modest
trade  diversion. 82 However,  the Flores  model finds much  smaller trade  effects for  Mercosur
countries than the Hinojosa-Ojeda et al. model. Moreover, the Flores model finds welfare effects
for  Mercosur  countries that  are generally positive and  significant (between  1 percent  and  2
percent of GDP per annum), whereas the Hinojosa-Ojeda et al. rnodel finds welfare effects for the
Mercosur countries that are generally positive but insignificant  (less than 0.25 percent of GDP per
annum). The explanation for the smaller trade effects in the Flores model are not entirely clear,
but they might be related to the model's specification of imperfect rather than perfect competition.
The explanation for the difference in welfare effects between the two  models is more certain.
Specifically, as Flores reports based on experiments with his model, increasing returns to  scale
contribute  more  extensively than  other model  features to  his  estimates of  welfare  gains  for
Mecrosur countries. 83
82  The absence  of trade diversion  in the simulation  results found  by the two studies  is not explained  by the study
investigators.
83  When Hinojosa-Ojeda,  Lewis, and Robinson  incorporate  the assumption  that productivity  growth is linked to
export performance  in their model, the three investigators  also report substantially  larger gains in  economic75
Finally, the results found by Hinojosa-Ojeda, Lewis,  amd Robinson indicate no  sizable
spillover effects of Mercosur on the Nafta countries or Chile, which is an "associate" member of
Mercosur  (as discussed in the next sub-section) and the most, outward-oriented country in the
Southern Cone. With regard to the rest of the world, what results are presented by Hinojosa-
Ojeda, Lewis, and Robinson indicate that other countries might enjoy substantially expanded trade
with Mercosur countries, amounting to more than $600 million. 84
Chile's Trade Policy Options. Having gradually adopted a uniform tariff of about  11
percent during recent years, Chile'is the most outward-oriented country in the  Southern Cone
region today.  Chile  might continue  to  liberalize its  trade  regime  on  a  unilateral  basis. But
regionalism in the Western Hemisphere presents Chile with opportunities to gain access to either
Mercosur or Nafta, on a free trade basis (Nafta) or a customs union basis (Mercosur). In 1996,
Chile agreed in principle to become an associate member of Mercosur and, in effect, to  form a
free trade  area with the Mercosur  countries, without precluding its  options also to  become  a
future member of Nafta.
Hinojosa-Ojeda, Lewis, and Robinson (1997) and Harrision, Rutherford, and Tarr (1997)
both  use multi-country CGE models of perfect competition with  constant returns  to  scale to
explore these and  other trade policy options facing Chile. Derived from their  larger  study of
Mercosur, the results found by Hinojosa-Ojeda, Lewis, and Robinson are mostly familiar, and
they indicate that Chile would benefit from joining either Merc;osur or Nafta, but not appreciably
(see Table 6, panel 4). The results found by Harrison, Rutherfoird,  and Tarr (hereafter HRT) differ
welfare  for Mercosur  countries,  specifically,  about 3 percent and 5 percent of GDP per annum for Argentina and
Brazil respectively.
84 An explanation  for this result is not provided  by Hinojosa-Ojeda,  Lewis,  and Robinson.76
importantly from those found by Hinojosa-Ojeda, Lewis, and Robinson, and they are reviewed
more extensively here (see Table 6, panel 5).
The HRT model is not particularly distinct from the other multi-country CGE models for
less developed countries reviewed here, except in one important regard. Whereas in most multi-
country models with  commodities and goods differentiated by place of production  values not
exceeding 5-to-10 are assumed for import demand elasticities of substitution, in the HRT model
"central" values for import demand elasticities of substitution are set equal to 30. The rationale for
assuming such large central values for import substitution elasticities is that  in the long-run (10
years  or  more) consumers will take  most if not  every opportunity to  substitute  lower-priced
imports for  higher-priced imports that  are otherwise very  similar. 85 This imparts  considerable
price-sensitivity to demands for traded goods in the model, "driving" solutions of the HRT model
nearer,  if  not  absolutely  near,  to  solutions  of  the  perfect-substitutes  trade  model  that
predominantly underlies the static theory of customs unions and free trade areas. 86
HRT  investigate three trade  policy options  for  Chile: (1)  accession to  Mercosur,  (2)
accession  to  Nafta,  and  (3)  unilateral  tariff  reduction  (UTR).  They  find  that  accession  to
Mercosur  is  not  beneficial to  Chile (economic welfare declines by  0.6  percent  of  GDP  per
annum). They find that  accession to Nafta is beneficial to  Chile (economic welfare improves by
85 Central values of higher-level  demand substitution  elasticities  for consumer  preferences  between  imported and
domestic  goods are set equal to 15. Notably, most econometric  studies suggest  values for both higher-level and
lower-level  demand substitution  elasticities much lower than either 15 and 30. See, for instance, Reinert and
Roland-Holst  (1992) and Shiells and Reinert (1993). However,  Reidel (1988) and Athukorala  and Reidel (1994)
contend  that, when quantitative  models  are properly specified,  demand  substitution  elasticities  are not statistically
different  from infinity,  making point estimates  of demand  substitution  elasticities  of 15 to 30 acceptable,  especially
for assumed  long  periods of adjustment  as in the HRT model.
86  In a perfect-substitutes  trade model,  Chile's potential  for increased  imports  (trade creation) under accession  to a
regional integration arrangement  might be less than reported in Table 6, especially  under Mercosur-accession,
depending on the ability of member countries to meet substantially  all of Chile's demand for imports without
significantly raising intra-bloc prices. For illustration of a strictly perfect-substitutes  trade model applied to
quantifying  the effects  of a free trade area formed  by a bloc  of small  countries,  see  DeRosa  and Saber  (1998).77
0.8 percent of GDP per annum). And finally, they find that UIR  to a uniform zero tariff is not
beneficial to  Chile (economic welfare declines by 0.3 percent of GDP per  annum). Thus, they
conclude that, for Chile, accession to Nafta "dominates" UTR, and UTR dominates accession to
Mercosur.
Accession to Nafta dominates other policy options for Chile because expanded access to
the  large  U.S.  market  within Nafta  achieves more by  way  of  expanding  Chile's exports  at
favorable  terms  of  trade  than  Chile  can  achieve  throughL  unilateral  tariff  reduction  (and
accompanying less favorable  terms of trade below Chile's optimum tariff level, simulated at 8
percent)  or than Chile can achieve through accession to Mercosur with its expanded access for
Chile to  small neighboring-country markets. 87 This is consistent with the hypothesis that a small
country might lose by joining a trading bloc in which it would become a relatively large member
(i.e., Chile in Mercosur) but would gain by joining a trading bloc in which it would be a small
member (i.e., Chile in Nafta).
Finally, HRT report the results of a sensitivity exercise in which they replace the "central"
values of the import demand substitution elasticity parameters in their model (equal to  30) by
"low" values equal to 8.88  This exercise yields trade and welfare effects more closely resembling in
sign and magnitude those found by Hinojosa-Ojeda, Lewis, and Robinson. In addition to  much
smaller simulated changes in trade flows than before (reflecting reduced price-sensitivity under
low values for the demand substitution elasticity parameters in the HRT  model), accession to
Nafta is welfare-improving for Chile by less than before (welfare improves by 0.3 percent of GDP
87  It is apparent from inspection of the change in trade flows reported in panel 5 of Table 6 that the change in
Chile's income  terms of trade (i.e., import  value divided  by export  value) is substantially  greater  than unity under
accession  to Nafta,  just less than unity under unilateral  tariff reduction  to the simulated  optimum  tariff level of 8
percent,  and substantially  less than unity under accession  to Mercosur.78
per annum rather than 0.8 percent of GDP per annum), and accession to Mercosur is no longer
welfare-reducing for Chile (welfare improves by between 0.0 lpercent  and 0.1 percent of GDP per
annum). Moreover, unilateral tariff reduction by Chile to  a uniform tariff rate of 8 percent (the
erstwhile  simulated optimum tariff  rate)  is  found  to  be  welfare-reducing for  Chile  (welfare
declines by 0.1 percent of GDP per annum), implying that the optimum tariff rate for Chile under
"low" demand substitution elasticity values must be considerably higher than 8 percent.
The results of the HRT sensitivity exercise point to the potentially crucial role that choice
of  values for  demand  substitution elasticities, and,  by  extension, choice  of  values for  other
parameters,  can play in  CGE  models used  to  assess the  implications of regional  integration
arrangements. More generally, choices of functional forms for behavioral and technical equations
may also have profound consequences for CGE model results.
Unfortunately, in the HRT model and similar models assuming Armington-type demand
systems and differentiated traded goods, the relationship between the magnitude of substitution
elasticity parameter values and simulated welfare effects is complex. For example, lowering the
magnitude of elasticity of substitution parameters in the HRT  model (and, thereby, presumably
reducing the magnitude of trade diversion effects but also trade creation effects 89) raised Chile's
simulated welfare  in  acceding  to  Mercosur  but  lowered the  country's  simulated welfare  in
acceding to Nafta. (The welfare impacts on other Mercosur and Nafta member countries are not
88  Values  of higher-level  demand substitution  elasticities  for consumer  preferences  between  imported  and domestic
goods  are set equal  to 4.
89 Low substitution  elasticity  values in demand systems  would  imply low values for the cross-price  elasticities of
demand  that govern  the magnitude  of trade diversion  effects  under customs  unions and free trade areas. However,
low substitution  elasticity  values would  also imply  low  values for the own-price  elasticities  of demand that govern
the magnitude of trade creation effects under regional integration  arrangements. Thus, with reference to trade
creation and diversion effects, the assumption  of lower versus higher values for demand substitution elasticity
parameters  has very uncertain  implications  for net trade creation.  Bhagwati  and Panagariya  (1996)  reach the same
general conclusion  but go on to identify circumstances  under both fixed and flexible  external terms of trade in79
reported by HRT, but they too might be considered equally unpredictable under different assumed
values for substitution elasticity parameters.) Thus, without very close reasoning that might differ
depending  on  the  circumstances  surrounding  individual countries  and  regional  integration
arrangements, assessing whether simulation results found by CGE models for key variables, such
as  changes in  trade  and  economic welfare, are biased by the; choice of  particular values for
demand substitution elasticities or other parameters is difficult  a priori.
In  considering the  simulation results found using  the HRT  model,  it  is important  to
understand  that  small  countries  producing  differentiated products  implicitly have  a  greater
measure of power to  affect the international terms of trade for their exports under low assumed
values for demand substitution elasticities. In the case of Chile's accession to Mercosur, this factor
might be sufficient to  transform the simulated welfare loss for Chile under  the assumed central
elasticity values to the  simulated small welfare gain for Chile lnder  the assumed low elasticity
values. In the case of Chile's accession to Nafta, this factor might seem to operate perversely (i.e.,
reducing the welfare gain of Chile). However, in the case of Chile's accession to Nafta, it should
be  recalled that  the country is joining a  large trading bloc. In this  case, Nafta  countries will
exercise a considerable influence on Chile's terms of trade for imports, more so than Mercosur
countries in the previous case, precisely because Nafta is a large trading bloc supplying a relatively
large share of Chile's import needs. Thus, Chile might worsen the external terms of trade for its
imports to  a greater extent in acceding to Nafta than in acceding to Mercosur, especially under
the assumed low substitution elasticity values, as increased demand by Chile for imports from
Nafta countries causes prices of Nafta-produced goods to rise, however modestly, and as a result
which greater presumption  might be brought to bear that regional integration arrangements  in the presence of
differentiated  products  would  be trade diverting  on a net basis.80
causes Chile's welfare gain from accession to Nafta to be marginal lower than under the assumed
central elasticity values.
Western Hlemisphere  Free Trade Area. Finally, consider the implications of a regional
integration arrangement  spanning the  entire  Western Hemisphere, as  called for  by the  1994
agreement to  establish the Free Trade Area of the Americas. The quantitative results of such an
exercise, shown in panel 6 of Table 6, are provided in the study by Hinojosa-Ojeda, Lewis, and
Robinson (1997) considered previously in which the investigators use a  CGE model of perfect
competition with constant returns to scale to  investigate the implications of both Mercosur  and
options for trade policy facing Chile.
Not  unlike in their previous quantitative findings, Hinojosa-Ojeda, Lewis, and Robinson
find that  a free trade  area  spanning the entire Western Hemisphere would create significantly
greater  trade  than  it  would  divert. However,  the  United  States  (again)  and  Chile  are  two
important exceptions. In connection with the imports of both the United States and Chile, trade
diversion is almost equivalent to trade creation. It is also apparent that Western Hemisphere trade
with the rest of the world is adversely affected.
Also  not  unlike  in  their  previous  quantitative  findings,  Hinojosa-Ojeda,  Lewis,  and
Robinson find that the impact on member country welfare is generally positive but not substantial.
For  the United  States,  the impact on welfare is nil. For the  remaining Western  Hemisphere
countries in the Hinojosa-Ojeda, Lewis, and Robinson model, the impact on welfare is less than
0.25 percent of GDP per annum.
A Summing Up81
Examination of quantitative studies of recent customs unions and free trade areas reveals a
considerable gulf between static theory and ex ante analysis of :regional  integration arrangements
using  CGE  models.  Unquestionably,  CGE  models  have  enriched  depiction  of  real-world
economies and their circumstances entering into regional trading arrangements. At the same time,
they have arguably introduced  uncertainties about  the  appropriate  specification of  economic
relationships and parameter values that  go "untested" or otherwise unresolved in CGE model-
based  studies  of regional  integration arrangements, albeit for  often practical  and  not  simply
expedient reasons.
Against the background of these uncertainties, the "evidence"  from the quantitative studies
of  recently established or  revitalized regional integration arrangements reviewed here  almost
uniforrnly points to the conclusion that regional trading arrangements established since 1990 are
trade-creating on a net basis and welfare-improving for member countries and trading blocs as a
whole. At the same time, this evidence suggests that static welfare gains of regional integration
arrangements for especially less developed countries are modest. at best (less that 0.3 percent of
GDP per annum). For advanced countries, quantitative results found using CGE models are more
favorable, at least in the case of regional integration under the Europe 1992 Plan (welfare gains of
1.0-to-2.0 percent of GDP per annum). However, the favorable quantitative results for advanced
countries are importantly contingent upon certain maintained assumptions in the underlying CGE
models, particularly imperfect competition, specific forms that imperfect competition might take,
and increasing returns to scale in manufacturing sectors.
In the fullness of time (and not withstanding the problem of defining an appropriate anti-
monde),  ex post  studies of  current regional integration arrangements should provide valuable
econometric or  other empirical verification of the  findings of the ex  ante quantitative studies82
reviewed here. Also, with  regard to  the use  of CGE models, it should be  re-emphasized that
although the remarkable  simulation capabilities of these models are  a  valuable aid to  policy
makers,  applied  economists,  and  even economic theoreticians,  they  raise  some  fundamental
questions about the appropriate specification of behavioral and technical relationships, and the
choice of parameter values in CGE and other analytical models. As Baldwin and Venables (1995)
suggest, the uncertainties surrounding simulation results found by CGE models should be more
widely recognized and "tested" through sensitivity  exercises designed to probe the implications of
key  assumed  economic relationships, functional forms,  and  parameter values  if  not  actually
confronting the  models with  data, for  instance, through  econometric  estimation  of particular
economic relationships or sectors in the models.
Finally, few quantitative studies of recent regional integration arrangements using CGE
models adequately indicate the potential spillover and feedback effects of customs unions and free
trade  areas. Indeed,  the  "rest  of  the world"  country in  most  multi-country  CGE  models  is
represented solely by trade equations that are merely complementary to  the trade equations of
complete national  models for  member  countries  in the  regional trading  arrangements under
investigation. Notwithstanding the down-side risk of constructing larger  "black boxes," future
quantitative studies of regional integration arrangements using CGE models should strive further
to  represent equilibrium of the global economy in order to  shed more dependable light on the
implications of regionalism for not only the world economy emanating from spillover effects but
also for  (both  small and  large) regional trading blocs  and their  individual member countries
emanating from the  direct effects of regional integration arrangements and also from  possible
international feedback effects as the world becomes increasingly populated with trading blocs and
as retaliatory (or simply competitive) behavior by the trading blocs comes more frequently to the83
fore. Given  uncertainties  regarding  the ultimate  significance  of expected spillover  and feedback
effects  (and limited  resources  for applied  modeling  and research),  a practical  interim  approach  to
assessing  the wider effects of regionalism  might be to concentrate  additional  modeling  efforts in
the near term on quantifying  the impacts  of regional  integration  arrangements  on neighboring  (or
natural)  non-member  trading  partners, following,  for instance,  the efforts of Leamer et al. (1995)
to assess  the wider effects  of Nafta.84
6.  Guidelines for Policy Making: Summary and Final Remarks
The static economic theory of regional integration arrangements emanates from serninal
contributions to the customs union issue by Viner (1950) and Meade (1955). Together, these two
volumes have spawned a vast literature on not only the economic theory of regional integration
arrangements but also both empirical and analytical varieties of quantitative studies investigating
customs unions and free trade areas. Today, both theoretical and quantitative studies of regional
integration arrangements are interrelated, taking inspiration from the other in a still ongoing quest
to determine what factors are crucial for regional integration arrangements to improve economic
well-being in member countries and the world at large.
Today, against the background of resurgent regionalism throughout the world, this quest
matters importantly for continued progress in international development and the global trading
system, both  of which  during the  last  several decades  have been  guided  predominantly by
multilateralism and nondiscrimination  rather than regionalism and discrimination in trade relations.
Moreover, national policy makers in both advanced countries and less developed countries have a
vital interest in knowing the impacts of regional integration arrangements on their economies.
Unfortunately, the static theory of regional integration arrangements finds that the impacts
of regionalism depend critically on the circumstances surroumding each arrangement, consistent
with  the theory  of  second-best in which intra-regional trade  liberalization and  other  seeming
movements  in  the  direction  of  Pareto-optimality  are  not  always  welfare-improving.  Thus,
beginning with Viner's (1950) early conclusion that, although regional integration arrangements
might be trade-creating, they might also be importantly trade-diverting (leaving their net impact
on trade  and economic welfare for member countries and parent trading blocs uncertain), the85
static theory of regional integration arrangements has mainly i.ailed to  date to  yield broad  or
universal guidelines for policy making.
What emerges from the static theory of regional integration arrangements is a limited set
of policy guidelines contingent upon the circumstances of counltries forming a regional trading
bloc and assumptions  of the underpinning theoretical economZic  models themselves. Particular
country  circumstances, such as  economic size, and particular economic assumptions, such as
extent  of  competitive behavior by  firms  or  homogeneity of  goods,  make  it  more  possible
sometimes to  derive definite results from theoretical models. However, they do not necessarily
apply to large numbers of real world cases.
The  present  study  derives eight  policy guidelines from  the  static theory  of  regional
integration arrangements. Table 7 indicates the particular circurrLstances  in which the eight policy
guidelines are  applicable to  individual countries  and  trading  blocs,  the  expected  impacts  of
regional integration arrangements on country welfare, trading bloc welfare, and world welfare,
and whether either ex post (i.e., empirical) or ex ante (i.e., analytical) quantitative studies support
the policy guidelines.
The policy guidelines on  regional  integration arrangements in  Table  7  are  applicable
mainly to  small trading  countries unable to  influence international terms  of trade  or  to  cease
trading  entirely  with  non-member  countries,  under  increasling (domestic)  cost  conditions,
homogenous traded goods,  and perfect competition. That is, they apply appropriately to  many
advanced  countries  and  particularly to  less  developed  countries.  The  prevalence  of  policy
guidelines derived from the highly stylized Vinerian static framework is somewhat off-putting
given that the Vinerian framework is a partial equilibrium  framework and largely neglects possibly
significant spillover and feedback effects of regionalism. Nonetheless, the policy guidelines based86
on the Vinerian framework are instructive and might still be deemed appropriate for judging the
impact of regional  integration  arrangements involving small countries  whose combined trade
usually accounts for only a small fraction of world trade.
The policy guidelines in Table 7 indicate circumstances in which small countries forming a
regional integration arrangement might expect their welfare to improve or deteriorate. Also, they
emphasize,  as  set  forth  in  policy  guideline 2,  the  advisability of  establishing  facilities for
compensatory lump-sum transfers or other intra-bloc payments to avoid the possibility that, where
a  trading bloc  would be  welfare-improving in the  aggregate,  the bloc would  not  be  formed
because  of  the  (justified) recalcitrance  of  one  or  more  would-be  member  countries  whose
economic welfare might be reduced by the adoption of the regiLonal  integration arrangement.
Without  denying their relevance, some policy guidelines in Table 7 seem appropriate on
common-sense if not tautological grounds. For instance, that regional integration arrangements
will be  welfare-improving if they  are formed by  countries that  are  predominantly least-cost
producers  of exportables (policy guideline 1) or if they give rise to increased imports from all
trading partners (policy guideline 4) are reasonable policy guidelines in simplest economic terms.
Yet, in all probability, few extant or even contemplated customs unions or free trade areas meet
such simple guidelines fully.
A subtly important aspect of the policy guidelines in Table 7 and the underlying static
theory of regional integration arrangements is the extent to which customs unions and free trade
areas  are expected to  result in  cessation of trade  (in homogenous  goods)  with  non-member
countries.  Where trade  between  member countries and non-member countries  is  expected to
continue  under  a  regional  integration  arrangement  (as  suggested  by  real  world  data),
internationally determined terms of trade rather  than regionally determined terms of trade  are87
likely to prevail within the trading bloc, limiting  the occurrence of positive production-related and
consumption-related trade creation effects but  not negative tariff revenue-related and resource
allocation-related trade  diversion effects. This is readily apparent  in the Vinerian model  (e.g.,
policy guideline 3 and case B under policy guideline 5), and i.t is also likely relevant to  similar
outcomes in the Meade model, not treated extensively in the economic literature, in which non-
member countries continue to supply imports to member countries under a regional integration
arrangement.
Among the most interesting and arguably "operational" policy guidelines in Table 7 are
those  concerning countries that might choose between joining a  large trading bloc or  a small
trading bloc (policy guideline 5), might choose to  form a  regional integration arrangement to
overcome hindrances facing their exports to third-countries (policy guideline 7), and might choose
to form a regional integration arrangement that could have strong pro-competitive effects in the
presence of imperfectly competitive markets and increasing returns to scale (policy guideline 8).
Of these  three  policy guidelines, policy guidelines 5  and  7,  confront  mainly less  developed
countries,  while  the  third  policy  guideline, policy  guideline 8,  confronts  mainly  advanced
countries.  Despite  the  indications given in  Table  7,  preseni; quantitative; support  for  policy
guidelines 5, 7, and  8 is rather "thin," and quantitative support  for the  third policy guideline
(policy guideline 8) is particularly subject to  further theoretical and methodological refinement.
Nonetheless, the economic bases for the three policy guidelines are among the most relevant and
compelling presented in the present study. For instance, that either small advanced countries or
small less  developed  countries  might  form  a  regional  integration  arrangement  to  overcome
partially if not fully the economic costs of protection in third-countries (policy guideline 7) offers
a possible explanation for the single-most common finding of recent quantitative studies using88
multi-country CGE models, namely, that new or proposed customs unions and free trade areas are
predominantly trade-creating  and  imply at  least  modest  economic gains  for  less  developed
countries and more appreciable if not substantial economic gains for advanced countries (the latter
economic gains in the presence of increasing returns to scale and imperfect competition).
With regard to the body of quantitative "evidence"  on regional integration arrangements at
large, few ex post or ex ante studies directly investigate guidelines for policy making on regional
integration arrangements. Presumably owing to the exigencies of the theory of second best,  ex
post and ex ante quantitative studies have instead investigated.  mainly the effects of regionalism on
net trade creation and economic welfare on a "one-off'  or case-by-case basis, neglecting more
direct  or  systematic analysis of the limited number of prolpositions and policy guidelines that
emerge from the static theory of regional integration arrangements. Also, in recent years, wider
use of CGE models and other applied models of regional integration arrangements has engendered
questions about the appropriate specification and functional form of key behavioral and technical
relationships in these models. Most prominently, the specification of increasing returns to  scale,
differentiated traded goods, and imperfect competition in many if not most CGE models used to
analyze regional integration arrangements departs from traditional assumptions of international
trade theory upon which the Vinerian and Meade models, and the policy guidelines in Table 7, are
principally based.  Also  in this  vein, different  assumptions regarding  the  extent  of  firm-level
economies of  scale and  different  specifications of  demand  systems for  similar imported  and
domestically produced  goods  can matter importantly for the  magnitude of trade  and welfare
impacts  simulated by  CGE  models  and,  ultimately, for  (indirect)  evaluation  of  the  policy
guidelines in Table 7. In time and subject to questions surrounding econometric as well as CGE
model results, ex post  studies of current regional integration arrangements might contribute in89
greater measure, and more strategically, to evaluating and verifying both extant and possibly new
guidelines on regional integration arrangements for policy makers.
Finally, although, as Baldwin and Venables (1995) emphasize, ex ante studies employing
CGE models should be confronted more frequently by real world data in the process of their
construction and evaluation of their simulation results, CGE and other applied economic models
are among the most  important tools that  both  applied economists and economic theoreticians
bring to the problem of deriving useful policy guidelines from the so-called large union Meade
model - the theoretical  model that  comes closest to  encompassing the  circumstances of the
increasingly "global" world economy today. Indeed, the multiplying if not also steeply mounting
centrifugal forces  of  regionalism in  the  world  economy today  might  be  expected  to  have
significant spillover and feedback effects on trade  and welfare in individual countries and the
world at large. Accordingly, national policy makers and international policy makers alike need to
be better  informed about the potential regional and worldwide impacts of regional integration
arrangements, to the extent that available theoretical and quantitative tools for economic analysis,
including multi-country  CGE  models better  approximating neoclassical trade  theory  and  its
modem extensions to domains such as imperfect competition theory, can provide valuable insights
if not new or improved policy guidelines on customs unions and free trade areas.90
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Figure 1(a). Home  Country101
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Table 1. Trade and Welfare Effects Assuning  Constant Costs of Production
Customs  Union
Algebraic  Representation  Sign
Home  Country
Change  in import  value 1/  (e +j) + (g + 1)  + f  Positive
Trade creation  (e + j) + (g + 1)  Positive
Trade diversion  k  Positive
Net trade creation  (e +j) + (g + 1)  -k  Uncertain
Change  in economic  surplus  a + b + c  Positive
Owing  to trade  creation  (a + e) + (c + g)  Positive
Production  effects  a + e  Positive
Consumption  effects  c + g  Positive
Owing  to trade diversion  -(e + g)  Negative
Production  effects  -e  Negative
Consumption  effects  -g  Negative
Other  21  b  Positive
Change  in tariff  revenue  - (b + f)  Negative
Change  in economic  welfare  3/  (a + c) -f  Uncertain
Partner  Countrv
Change  in import  value 1/  i +j + I + m  Positive
Trade  creation  i +j  + I + m  Positive
Trade  diversion  ...  ...
Net trade creation  i +j + I + m  Positive
Change  in econonic surplus  a+b+c+d+e+f+g+h  Positive
Owing  to trade creation  (a + d + e) + (c + g + h)  Positive
Production  effects  (a + d + e)  Positive
Consumption  effects  (c + g + h)  Positive
Owing  to trade diversion  ...  ...
Production  effects  ...  ...
Consumption  effects  ...  ...
Other  2/  (b +f)  Positive
Change  in tariff  revenue  _ (b + )  Negative
Change  in economnic  welfare  3/  (a + d + e)  + (c +  g +  h)  Positive
Customs  Union  4/
Change  in import  value  (e+ 2j + i) + (g+21  +m)+  f  Positive
Net trade creation  (e +2j  + i)+ (g +21 +m)-  k  Uncertain
Change  in economic  surplus  2 (a + b + c) + (d + e + f + g + h)  Positive
Change  in tariff  revenue  -2 (b + f)  Negative
Change  in economic  welfare  3/  2 (a + c) + (d+ e+ g+h)  - f  Uncertain
Source: Calculations based on areas identified in Figure  1 by ordinary typeset letters  (home country) and bold-
italic typeset letters (partner country).
1/ Change in import value evaluated at border prices.
2/ Change in consumer surplus or producer surplus owing to tariff reduction.
3/ Change in economic surplus plus change in tariff revenue.
4/ Sum of changes  in variables for home  country and partner  country. Calculations  assume  that  similar
areas in Figure 1 for the home country and the partner country are equal in magnitude.103
Table 1 (Concluded). Trade and Welfare Effects Assuming Constant Costs of Production
MIN Trade Liberalization
Algebraic  Representation  Sign
Home Country
Change  in import  value 1/  i + j +1 + m  Positive
Trade creation  i+j+l+m  Positive
Trade  diversion  ...  ...
Net trade creation  i + j + 1+ m  Positive
Change  in economic  surplus  a+b+c+d+  e+f+g+h  Positive
Owing  to trade creation  (a + d + e) + (c + g + h)  Positive
Production  effects  (a + d + e)  Positive
Consumption  effects  (c + g + h)  Positive
Owing  to trade diversion  ...  ...
Production  effects  ...  ...
Consumption  effects  ...  ...
Other  2/  (b + f)  Positive
Change  in tariff  revenue  -(b + f)  Negative
Change  in economic  welfare  3/  (a + d + e) + (c + g + h)  Positive
Partner Countrv
Change  in import  value 1/  i +j + I + m  Positive
Trade creation  i+j+I+m  Positive
Trade  diversion
Net trade creation  i +j + I + m  Positive
Change  in economic  surplus  a+b+c+d+e+f+g+h  Positive
Owing  to trade creation  (a + d + e) + (c +  g + h)  Positive
Production  effects  (a + d + e)  Positive
Consumption  effects  (c + g +  I)  Positive
Owing  to trade diversion  ...  ...
Production  effects  ...  ...
Consumption  effects  ...  ...
Other  2/  (b +-J)  Positive
Change  in tariff  revenue  - (b +J)  Negative
Change  in economic  welfare  3/  (a + d + e) + (c +  g +  h)  Positive
Customs  Union 4/
Change  in import  value  2 (i + j  + 1 + m)  Positive
Net trade creation  2 (i + j + 1  + m)  Positive
Change  in economic  surplus  2 (a + b + c + d + e + f + g + h)  Positive
Change  in tariff  revenue  -2 (b + f)  Negative
Change  in economnic  welfare  2/  2 [(a + d + e) + (c + g + h)]  Positive
Source: Calculations based on areas identified in Figure 1 by ordinary typeset letters (home country) and bold-
italic typeset letters (partner country).
1/ Change in import value evaluated at border prices.
2/ Change in consumer surplus or producer surplus owing to tariff reduction.
3/ Change in economic surplus plus change in tariff revenue.
4/ Sum of changes  in variables  for home country and  partner  country.  Calculations assume  that  similar
areas in Figure 1 for the home country and the partner country are equal in magnitude.104
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Figure  2.  Home  Country105
Table 2. Trade and Welfare Effects Assuming Increasing Costs of Prodaction
Customs  Union
Algebraic  Representation  Sign
Home  Countrv
Change  in import  value I/  ...  ...
Trade creation  ...  ...
Trade diversion  e + f  Positive
Net trade creation  - (e + f)  Negative
Change  in economic  surplus  ...  ...
Owing  to trade creation  ...  ...
Production  effects
Consumption  effects  ...  ...
Owing  to trade diversion  ...  ...
Production  effects  ...  ...
Consumption  effects  ...  ...
Other  2/  ...  ...
Change  in tariff revenue  -(l+m+z)  [z=2(a+b)]  Negative
Change  in economic  welfare  3/  - (I + m + z)  Negative
Partner Countrv
Change  in export  value I/  e + f  Positive
Trade creation  e + f  Positive
Trade diversion  ...  ...
Net trade creation  e + f  Positive
Change  in economnic  surplus  (1  + m) + (a + b)  Positive
Owing  to trade creation  ...  ...
Production  effects  ...  ...
Consumption  effects  ...  ...
Owing  to trade diversion  a + b  Positive
Production  effects  a + b [=  z -(a  + b)]  Positive
Consumption  effects  ...  ...
Other  2/  l+m  Positive
Change  in tariff revenue  ...  ...
Change  in economic  welfare  3/  (I + m) + (a + b)  Positive
Customs  Union  41
Change  in trade value  e + f  Positive
Net trade creation  ...  ...
Change  in economic  surplus  (I + m) + (a + b)  Positive
Change  in tariff revenue  - (1  + m + z)  Negative
Change  in economic  welfare 31  -(a + b)  Negative
Source: Calculations based on areas identified in Figure 2.
I/ Change in trade value evaluated at initial border prices.
2/ Change in consumer surplus or producer surplus owing to tariff reduction.
3/ Change in economic surplus plus change in tariff revenue.
4/ Sum of changes in variables for home country and partner country.106
Table 2 (Concluded). Trade and Welfare Effects Assuming Increasing Costs of Production
MFN  Trade Liberalization
Algebraic  Representation  Sign
Home  Countrv
Change  in import  value 1/  n + e + h  Positive
Trade creation  n+e+h  Positive
Trade diversion  ...  ...
Net trade creation  n + e + h  Positive
Change  in economic  surplus  (a + k + m + d) + (c +  j  + b)  Positive
Owing  to trade creation  a + k + m + d  Positive
Production  effects  a + k + m  Positive
Consumption  effects  d  Positive
Owing  to trade diversion
Production  effects  ...  ...
Consumption  effects  ...  ...
Other  2/  c + j + b  Positive
Change  in tariff revenue  - (c + j + b)  Negative
Change  in economic  welfare  3/  a + k + m + d  Positive
Partner Count
Change  in export  value
Trade creation  ...
Trade diversion  ...  ...
Net trade creation  ...
Change  in economic  surplus  ...  ...
Owing  to trade creation  ...
Production  effects  ...  ...
Consumption  effects  ...  ...
Owing  to trade diversion  ...  ...
Production  effects  ...  ...
Consumption  effects  ...  ...
Other  2/  ...  ...
Change  in tariff  revenue  ...  ...
Change  in economic  welfare  3/  ...  ...
Customs  Union  4/
Change  in import  value 1/  n + e + h  Positive
Net trade creation  n + e + h  Positive
Change  in economic  surplus  (a + k + m + d) + (c +  j + b)  Positive
Change  in tariff  revenue  - (c +j + b)  Negative
Change  in economic  welfare  3/  a + k + m + d  Positive
Source: Calculations based on areas identified in Figure 2.
1/ Change in import value evaluated at border prices.
2/ Change in consumer surplus or producer surplus owing to tariff reduction.
3/ Change in economic surplus plus change in tariff revenue.
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Table 3. Recent Quantitative  Studies of  Regional  Integration  Arrangements:  European  Union
Change in Trade Flows  Change
Study  in
Study  Description,  Exports  Imports  Economic
Investigators  Base Year  Sectors  Countries  (Extra-Bloc)  (Extra-Bloc)  Welfare
Gasiorek,  Smith,  and Venables  - GSV  Ex ante study using  a  13 manufacturing  goods  EC  n.a. (positive)  n.a. (negative)  1.35
(1992)  computable  general  equilibrium  sectors,  plus  2 non-  France  n.a.  na.  1.50
(CGE)  model  of imperfect  manufacturing  sectors.  Germany  n.a.  n.a.  0.90
competition  with  differentiated  Capital  is mobile  Italy  ILa.  n.a.  1.80
products,  increasing  returns to  between  countries,  but  U.K.  n.a.  n.a.  1.90
scale, and inter-industry  flows.  labor  by 4 skill types is  EC North  n.a.  n.a.  0.80
1985.  assumed  immobile.  Greece,  Ireland  n.a.  n.a.  2.90
Iberia  n.a.  n.a.  2.90
Rest of the World  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.
Notes: Regional  integration  under the 1992  Plan for the European  Union is assumed to reduce intra-bloc  trade costs by 2.5 percent of the initial value of EC
trade in each  sector and to eliminate  price discrimination  by manufacturing  firms between  EC markets. The reductions  in intra-bloc  trade costs accrue only to EC
fims, enabling them to increase  their competitiveness  in both domestic  and international  markets. Consumer  demand for similar (i.e., differentiated)  products is
aggregated  in the model by constant  elasticity  of substitution  sub-utility  functions.  In the long-run  solution  of the model, there is free entry and exit of competing
firns in each sector. The change  in economic  welfare is given by compensating  variation in income, expressed as a percentage  of GDP. Substantially  smaller
changes  in welfare are found if price discrimination  by firms between  EC markets is assumed  to persist under regional integration.  In general, intra-EC trade
liberalization  is found to have significant  pro-competitive  effects. It also results in substantial  trade diversion,  including within the EC, as regional producers
achieve  higher economies  of scale but experience  declining  terms  of trade - prompting  exit by large numbers of  manufacturing  frrma.
Haaland  and Norman  (1992)  Ex ante study using  a CGE  12  manufacturing  EC  n.a.  n.a.  0.48
model similar  to the GSV  sectors,  plus 1 non-
(1992) model of imperfect  traded goods  sector.  EFTA  n.a.  n.a.  -0.10
competition  with differentiated  Capital  is
products, increasing  returns to  internationally  mobile,  USA  n.a.  n.a.  -0.01
scale, and inter-industry  flows.  but labor by 2 skill
1985.  types is not.  Japan  n.a.  n.a.  -0.01
Notes: Similar to GSV (1992), but additionally  the study finds  that the EU plan poses little or no economic threat to Japan or USA. Welfare  effects are smaller
than found  by GSV  presumably  because the  smaller-scale  model does  not involve  extensive  disaggregation  of  EC regions.  9
Harrison,  Rutherford,  and Tarr  - lRT  Ex ante study  using a CGE  26 sectors, 12 of  which  BC  1.18
(1994)  model  of imnerfect  competition  are manufacturing  Belgium  3.37
with differentiated  products,  sectors. Primary  Germany  1.10
increasing  returns  to scale, and  production  factors,  Denmark  To be completed on  To be completed on  1.82
inter-industry  flows. 1985.  including  capital and  Spain  the basis of HRT  the basis of HRT  0.80
different  types of labor,  France  (1994), Tables A2  (1994), Tables A2  1.13
are mobile  across  Italy  and A3  and A3  1.05
sectors  domestically  but  Netherlands  2.48
internationally  Portugal  1.04
immobile.  U.K.  0.  S0
Rest of  the World  -0.00
Notes: Unlike  previous  studies of the pro-competitive  effects of the EU plan, the study does not impose uniform  pricing  by firms across  EC markets. Instead, it
allows  price discrimination,  but models integration  as a process that involves increasing  possibilities for substitution  between similar products produced by
competing  EC fimis in each EC market, by adjusting assumed values of relevant demand substitution elasticities for groups of competing products using a
flexible form of constant  elasticity of substitution  sub-utility  functions  for consumers.  The 1992 Plan for the EU is (again) represented  by a reduction of 2.5
percent in intra-bloc  trade costs  but decomposed  into reductions  in border  costs and production  standardization  costs. The change  in economic  welfare  is given  by
compensating  variation in income,  expressed  as a percentage  of GDP. Notwithstanding  its allowance for continued segmented  markets, the study finds that pro-
competitive  effects operating  through  the effects of standardization  on consumer  demand elasticities contribute substantially  to the simulated  gains in economic
welfare.  It also fmds owing to its allowance  for continued price discrimination  that intra-EC trade expands strongly  and only a modest  decline in trade between
EC countries  and the rest of the  world occurs.112
Table 4.  Recent Quantitative  Studies  of Regional  Integration  Arrangements:  North  American  Free Trade Agreement  (Nafts)
Change  in Trade Flows  Change
Study  in
Study  Description,  Exports  Imports  Economic
Investigators  Base Year  Sectors  Countries  (Extra-Bloc)  (Extra-Bloc)  Welfare
Bachrach  and Mizrahi (1992)  Ex ante study using CGE  36 traded goods  sectors,  Nafta  2,401 (190)  1,294  (-81)  n.a.
models  of perfect competition  plus 8 services  sectors.  Canada  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.
for Mexico and USA with  Primary  factors  of  Mexico  546 (-21)  1,149(45)  0.32
differentiated  products,  constant  production  include  United  States  1,855(211)  145  (-126)  0.02
returns  to scale, and inter-  capital, labor, and  Rest of the World  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.
industry  flows. 1988.  energy  resources.
Notes:  Integration  of the Mexican  and U.S. economies  is simulated  by the elimination of tariff and nontariff  barriers to bilateral trade between  the two countries,
where the latter barriers are measured in tariff-equivalent  form. An AIDS  demand system is specified in conjunction with the assumption  of differentiated
products  by place of production.  Demand  for different types of goods is characterized  by flexible substitution elasticities  between goods. However,  sub-utility
functions  are of the familiar constant  elasticity of substitution  form. Changes  in trade flows  are in millions  of U.S. dollars, and changes  in economic  welfare are
percentage  changes  in real GDP. Much greater impacts are found when Mexico is assumed to liberalize simultaneously  its inward foreign direct investment
policies.  Apparent  trade diversion  is appreciable  in the case  of exports  by Mexico and substantial  in the case of imports  by the U.S.
Brown,  Deardorff,  and Stem (1992)  Ex ante study using a  23 traded goods  sectors  Nafta  17,688  (n.a.)  17,864  (n.a.)  n.a.
computable  general equilibrium  and 6 nontraded  goods  Canada  6,108 (n.a.)  5,537 (n.a.)  0.70
(CGE)  model of imperfect  sectors.  Capital and  Mexico  2,984 (n.a.)  2,952 (n.a.)  1.60
competition  with differentiated  labor are perfectly  United  States  8,596 (n.a.)  9375 (n.a.)  0.10
products, increasing  retums  to  mobile between  sectors  Rest of  the World  -476  -830  -0.00
scale, and inter-industry  flows.  but internationally
1989.  immobile.
Notes: Nafta is represented  by removal of tariffs on trade among Canada, Mexico, and the United States, and expansion of U.S. import quotas applied to
Mexican exports of agriculture,  food, textiles, and clothing by 25 percent. Products in all industries are characterized  by product differentiation,  according to
either country of origin  or producing  firm. Sub-utility  functions  are generally  of the constant  elasticity  of substitution  form. Changes in trade flows are in millions
of  U.S. dollars,  and changes  in economic  welfare  are equivalent  variation  in income expressed  as a percent of  GDP. In the simulation  results,  the terms of  trade of
the United States  improve  marginally  while those  of Canada and Mexico deteriorate  marginally,  with  the result  that imports  expand by more than exports  only for
the United States.  In all three countries,  however,  the expansion  of trade is sufficient to guarantee  welfar gains. The terms  of trade and economic  welfare of the
rest of the world deteriorate  marginally,  with apparent trade diversion. Under a scenario  in which Mexico is assumed  to liberalize simultaneously  its inward
foreign  direct investment,  economic  gains  to Mexico and the United  States,  but not Canada, are about  three times greater.
Roland-Horst,  Reinert, and Shiells  (1992,  Ex ante study using  a CGE  26-sector  aggregation,  Nafta  83,540 (6,408)  73,839 (22)  n.a.
1994)  model  of imperfect  competition  with 20 tradable  goods  Canada  46,439 (956)  27, 565 (3,016)  10.57
with differentiated  products,  sectors.  Capital  and  Mexico  3,472 (1,097)  5,731 (758)  3.38
increasing  returss to scale, and  labor are domestically  United States  33,629 (4,355)  40,543 (-3,752)  2.07
inter-industry  flows. 1988.  mobile between  sectors  Rest ofthe World  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.
but  intemationally
immnobile.
Notes: Nafta is represented  by elimination  of tariffs and nontariff barriers  to trade among  Canada, Mexico, and the United States. Differentiated  products are
specified  for the demand and supply  of tradable commodities,  using constant  elasticity of substitution  functions.  Monopolistic  firms are assumed to set price at
the level of their average costs,  following  the contestable  markets  hypothesis.  Changes in trade flows  are in millions of U.S. dollars, and changes in economic
welfare are percentage  changes  in real GDP. Sensitivity  tests indicate that welfare gains are about 40 percent smaller if imperfect  competition  is altematively
characterized  by firm pricing  according to perceived  values of market demand  elasticities (so-called  Coumot monopolistic  pricing). Apparent  trade diversion  in
the case of imports  by the U.S. is modest, and it does  not appear to be a factor  in imports  by Canada  or Mexico.113
Table 5. Recent Quantitative  Studies of Regioral Integration  Arrangements:  Asia
Change in Trade Flows  Change
Study  in
Study  Description,  Exports  Imports  Economic
Investigators  Base Year  Sectors  Countries  (Extra-Bloc)  (Extra-Bloc)  Welfare
Asean  Free Trade  Area (Afta)
DeRosa  (1995)  Ex ante study using  a CGB  27 sectors  including  a  Asean  2,446 (-229)  2,446 (-234)  na.
model  of perfect  competition  nontraded  sector.  Indonesia  342 (77)  342 (-S)  0.23
with differentiated  products,  Capital  is specific  to  Malaysia  536 (-135)  536 (-167)  1.30
constant  returss to scale, and  individual  sectors,  while  Philippines  171  (37)  171 (-43)  0.41
inter-industry  flows. 1988.  labor is mobile between  Singapore  993 (-314)  993 (377)  3.86
sectors.  All primary  Thailand  405 (106)  405 (-393)  0.56
factors  are  Rest of  the World  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.
intemationally
immobile.
Notes: Afta is represented  by elimination  of all tariffs and reduced  nontariff baniers to intra-Asean  trade. Consumers  differentiate  simiiar products, including
domestic  substitutes,  according to place of production  and constant  elasticity of substitution  utility fiuetions. Changes in trade flows are in nillions of U.S.
dollars,  and changes  in economic  welfare  are  percentage  changes  in real absorption  (i.e., real final demand).  Apparent  trade diversion  is relatively small. Welfare
impacts reveal sharp differences in  expected economaic  gains among Afia members. Concerted nondiscrimainatory  trade liberalization is found to  provide
signficantly larger  gains  in trade and welfare  for the Asean  countries.
Lewis and Robinson  (1996)  Ex ante study using  a CGE  12 sectors,  including  Asean  1,080 (n.a.)  1,080  (n.a.)  n.a.
model  of perfect  competition  one services  sector.  Indonesia  140 (n.a.)  140  (n.s.)  0.03
with differentiated  products,  Primary  factors  (capital,  Malaysia  & Sing.  60 (n.a.)  60 (n.a.)  0.04
constant  returns  to scale,  and  land,  and two types  of  Philippines  290 (n.a.)  290 (&a.)  0.14
inter-industry  flows. 1992.  labor)  are domestically  Thailand  590 (.a.)  590 (n.a.)  0.18
mobile between  sectors  China  -10  -10  -0.01
but internationally  Korea  & Taiwan  -20  -10  0.00
immobile.  Japan  0  -20  0.00
United States  20  0  0.00
European  Union  20  0.00
Notes: Aila is represented  by the elimination  of all tariff and nontariff  baniers to imports  among Asean  countries. The impacts  are incremental  to the simulated
wffects  of the Uruguay Round agmrepennt.  Cosumces differentiato goods and services by country of origin.  iIport  dtonvds  are modeled  paing  to  e Ac  DS
specification  which allows  i  gport  eependiture  clasticities  to differ from one and crossecos  try substitution  elasticipies  to vany for dielent  pairs ofcountriDs.
Changes  in trade  iisrws aie ihi  mdilfious  of U.S. dollaml  and chrnge=  in ecnonmnic  tfsre  ar  perntge  o.h;nges  in real GMP.
Asia-Pacific  Free Trade  Area
Lewis, Robinson,  and Wang  (1995)  Ex ante study uing a CGE  10  tradables  sectors,  Asia-Pacific  Fta  69.87 (-25.36)  69.87 (-26.48)  n.a.
model  ofperfectcompetition  including 1 services  United  States  15.22  (-17.00)  15.22 (-10.12)  0.04
with differentiated  products,  sector. 4 primary  Japan  26.13 (-3.96)  26.13 (-10.45)  0.74
constant  returns  to scale,  and  factors  of  production  China  5.38 (-7.65)  5.38 (-1.38)  0.13
inter-industry  flows. 1989.  (capital,  land, and two  Asean-4  8.41 (2.52)  8.41 (-2.04)  0.36
types  of labor)  are  Asian NEs  14.73  (0.73)  14.73  (-2.49)  2.44
domestically  mobile  Rest of the  World
between  sectors  but  European  Union  -0.18  -0.18  0.05
internationally  Other  -26.30  -26.30  n.a.
immobile,
Notes: An  Asia-Pacific  free trade area is represented  by the elimination  of all tariff and nontariffbaners to imports  among  the prospective  participants  in the free
trade area. Consumers  differentiate  goods  and services by country of origin. Import  demands are modeled using the AIDS specification  which allows import
expenditure  elasticities  to differ  from one and cross-country  substitution  elasticities  to vary for different pairs of countries.  Changes  in trade flows  are in billions
of U.S. dollars,  and changes in economic  welfare  are percentage  changes  in real absorption  (i.e., real final demand). Trade diversion  is appreciable  and fall
particularly  heavily on other less developed  countries.  Experiments  linking  productivity  changes  to export performance  in the model indicate that welfare gains
from the envisioned  free trade area would be substantially  higher,  especially  for the Asean-4  and Asian NEs. Other experments with the model indicate that if
prospective  members  decline to join the free trade area, they  will suffer  economic  losses, while  the members  of the smaller free trade area gain less than in the
case of  a broader free trade area.114
Table 6. Recent Quantitative  Studies  of Regional  Integration  Arrangements:  Westem  Hemisphere
Change in Trade Flows  Change
Study  in
Study  Description,  Exports  Imnports  Economic
Investigators  Base Year  Sectors  Countries  (Extra-Bloc)  (Extra-Bloc)  Welfare
Greater  North  America  Frbe Trade Area
1. Hinojosa-Ojeda,  Lewis, and Robinson  Ex ante study using  a CGE  II sectors,  including a  Greater Nafta  45.23 (-1.80)  36.94 (-12.37)  n.a.
(1995)  model  ofperfect competition  services  sector. Capital,  United States  9.59 (-0.38)  7.80 (-0.15)  0.00
with differentiated  products,  land, and 4 types of  Mexico  5.93 (-0.10)  4.07 (-3.39)  0.14
constant  retums  to scale, inter-  labor are domestically  Central America  11.77 (-0.81)  12.45 (-3.84)  0.02
industry  flows,  and labor  mobile  between  sectors.  Caribbean  17.94 (-0.51)  12.62 (-4.99)  0.24
migration. 1988.  Unskilled  labor is  Rest of the World  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.
mobile  between  Mexico
and U.S.
Notes:  Regional  integration  of all countries  and sub-regions  in greater North  America is represented  by elimination of all tariff and nontariff  barriers  between  the
countries  and sub-regions  while  maintaining  all countries'  previous  levels  of protection with the rest of the world.  Consumers  differentiate goods and services  by
country  of origin,  and bilateral import demands are modeled using the AIDS  specification  which allows import expenditure elasticities  to differ from one and
cross-country  substitution  elasticities to vary for different pairs of countries.  Changes in trade flows are in billions of U.S. dollars, and changes in welfare are
measured  by percentage  changes  in real GDP. Trade diversion,  as measured  by the change  in imports  from non-member  countries, is appreciable  for especially
Mexico. "Hub-and-spoke"  simulations  alternatively  assuming  Mexico or U.S. as hub-country  find larger gains for the Caribbean and Central American countries
and for the respective hub-countries  than under  Nafta but not Gnafta.  Simulations  assuming  productivity  growth  is linked to export performance  find the largest
quantitativc  impacts of Gnafta.
Mercosur
2. Flores  (1997)  Ex ante study using  a CGE  9 sector  with 5 sectors  Mercosur  184  (81)  105 (2)  n.a.
model ofimperfect competition  identified  as  Argentina  n.a.  n.a.  1.80
with differentiated  products,  imperfectly  competing.  Brazil  n.a.  n.a.  1.10
increasing  returns  to scale, and  Capital [and  labor (?)]  Uruguay  n.a.  n.a.  2.30
inter-industry  flows  pattemed  are mobile  domestically  Rest of  the World  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.
after GSV (1992). 1990.  and within Mercosur.  x
Notes:  Regional integration  under Mercosur  is represented  by adoption  of common  external  tariffs per sector equal to a weighted average of members'  effective
tariffs in the  base year and by reduction  of intra-regional  trade costs, except  intra-regional  transport costs.  Products  are differentiated  by country  of origin, and by
firm in the case of imperfect  competition  sectors,  using constant  elasticity of substitution  utility functions  for products by country of origin. Changes in trade
flows are in [millions] of U.S. dollars, and extra-bloc trade refers to trade by members with EC and Nafta countries. Changes in welfare are measured by
compensating  variation as a percent of base-year  GDP. Analysis  of welfare  gains finds  that the largest gains  are due to scale economy  effects, followed by those
due to reductions  in tariffs and trade costs.  Trade  diversion  effects  are mostly  insignificant,  including  in individual sectors.
3. Hinojosa-Ojeda,  Lewis, and Robinson  Ex ante study using  a CGE  II sectors,  including a  Mercosur  1,390  (580)  1,390 (580)  n.a.
(1997)  model ofperfect competition  services  sector. Capital,  Brazil  890 (380)  890 (590)  0.10
with differentiated  products,  land, and 4 types  of  Argentina  500 (200)  500 (-10)  0.11
constant  returns  to scale, inter-  labor are domestically  Nafta  0 (0)  0 (0)  n.a.
industry  flows,  and labor  mobile.  Unskilled  labor  Mexico  0 (0)  0 (0)  -0.00
migration. 1990.  is mobile  between  U.S.  0 (0)  0 (0)  0.00
Mexico and U.S.  Chile  0  0  -0.00
Rest of the World  630  630  n.a.
Notes: Mercosur  regional integration is represented by elimination of all tariff and nontariff baniers between Brazil and Argentina while maintaining all
countries'  previous  levels of protection  with the rest of the world,.  Consumers  differentiate  goods  and services  by country of origin, and bilateral import demands
are modeled using the AIDS  specification  which allows import  expenditure elasticities  to differ from one and cross-country  substitution elasticities  to vary for
different pairs of countries.  Changes  in trade flows  are in millions  of U.S. dollars,  and changes  in welfare are measured  by percentage  changes  in real GDP. Trade
diversion  is not appreciable.  Simulations  assuming  productivity  growth  is linked to export  performance  find the largest quantitative  impacts  of Mercosur.115
Table 6 (Continued). Recent Quantitative  Studies  of Regional  Integration  Arrangements:  Western  Hmisphere
Change  in Trade Flows  Change
Study  in
Study  Description,  Exports  Imports  Economic
Investigators  Base Year  Sectors  Countries  (Extra-Bloc)  (Extra-Bloc)  Welfare
Chilean Accession  to Mrcosur.  Nafta
4. Hinojosa-Ojeda,  Lewis, and Robinson  Ex ante study  using a CGE  11 sectors,  including  Mercosur  Accsn.
(1997)  model of  perfect competition  the sevices setor.  Mercosur  1,530  (490)  1,530 (500)  n.a.
with differentiated  products.  Capital,  land, and 4  Chile  70 (-10)  70 (-70)  0.06
constant  retums  to scale, inter-  types of labor are  Argentina  520 (150)  520 (-10)  0.11
industry  flows,  and labor  domestically  mobile  Brazil  940 (350)  940 (580)  0.10
migration. 1990.  between  sectors.  Nafta  1,490 (-650)  1,490  (-640)  n.a.
Unskilled  labor is  United  States  470 (-790)  470 (-420)  0.00
mobile between  Mexico  Mexico  1,020 (140)  1,020  (-220)  0.21
and U.S.  Rest of World  -60  -60  n.a.
Nafta  Accession
Nafls  1,580  (-740)  1,580 (-660)  n.a.
Chile  90 (90)  90 (-10)  0.08
United  States  470 (-950)  470 (-410)  0.00
Mexico  1,020  (120)  1,020  (-240)  0.22
Mercosur  1,390 (560)  1,390 (570)  n.a.
Argentina  500 (190)  500 (-10)  0.11
Brazil  890 (370)  890 (580)  0.10
Rest of  World  -50  -50  n.a.
Notes:  Regional  integration  of Westem  Henisphere countries  under Mercosur  and Nafta,  including  Chile altematively in either Mercosur  or Nafta, is represented
by elimination  of all tariff and nontariff  barriers  between  countries  in the same region while  maintaining  all countries'  previous levels of protection with the rest
of the world.  Consumers  differentiate  goods and services  by country of origin, and bilateral import demands are modeled using the AIDS  specification  which
allows import  expenditure  elasticities  to differ from one and cross-country  substitution  elasticities  to vary for different pairs of countries.  Changes in trade flows
are in millions of U.S. dollars, and changes in welfare are measured  by percentage  changes in real GDP. Trade diversion is appreciable in connection with
imports  by Chile under the country's  accession  to Mercosur,  but less so under its accession  to Nafta.
5. Hanrison,  Rutherford,  and Tarr  (1997)  Ex ante study  using a CGE  24-sector  aggregation,  Mercosur  Accsn.
model of perfect  competition  including  3 nontraded  Chile  -Mercosur  4,575 (n.a.)  3,221 (n.a.)  -0.62
with differentiated  products,  goods  sectors. Primary  Argentina - Mercosur  nLa.  (n.a.)  n.a. (n.a.)  n.a.
constant  retuma  to scale, and  faqto,c ( apital, labor.  Brazil  -Mercosur  n.a. (n.a.)  n.a. (na.)  n.a.
inter-industry  flows. 1994.  and land) are  U.S.  -Nafta  n.a. (n.a.)  n.a. (n.a.)  n.a.
domestically  mobile  Rest of World  n.a.  n.a.  nta.
across  sectors,  but are  Nafla Accession
intmationally  Chile  -Nafta  2,735 (n.a.)  4,461 (n.a.)  0.82
ismobile.  Argentina - Mercosur  n.a. (n.a.)  n.a. (n.a.)  n.a.
Brazil  -Mercosur  n.a. (n.a.)  n.a. (n.a.)  n.a.
U.S.  - Nafta  n.a. (n.a.)  n.a. (n.a.)  n.a.
Rest of World  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.
Chile  - to 8%  848  965  0.02
Chile  -to 0%  n.a.  n.a.  -0.26
Notes: Chilean accession to Mercosur  or Nafta is represented  by reductions in tariff and nontariff barriers to intra-bloc trade. Demand is characterized by
constant  elasticity of substitution  utility funictions  which allow  multi-stage  budgeting  for products differentiated  by their country of production.  Long-tern (10
year) substitution  elasticity  values for competing  imports  are set at 30, while those  for competing  imports  and domestic  products  are set at 15. Simulations  assume
tariff  revenue losses  are offset  by an equal  proportionate  increase  of the existing value-added  tax, yielding tax revenue-neutral  results.  Changes in trade flows are
in millions  of U.S. dollars, and changes  in welfare  are measured  by equivalent  variation in income as a percentage  of GDP. Additional scenarios  indicate that
when Chilean  accession  to either Mercosur  or Nafta  is accompanied  by reductions  in Chile's  extemal trade barriers, greater welfare  gains are obtained. In  tenns of
welfare gains, accession  to  Nafta dominates  unilateral tariff reduction (UTR) by Chile, including when Chile's tariffs are reduced to their optimum level,
estimated  at about 8 percent.116
Table 6 (Concluded).  Recent Quantitative  Studies  of Regional  Integration  Arrangements:  Western  Hemisphere
Change  in Trade Flows  Change
Study  in
Study  Description,  Exports  Imnports  Economic
Investigators  Base Year  Sectors  Countries  (Extra-Bloc)  (Extra-Bloc)  Welfare
Western  Hemisphere  Free Trade  Area
6. Hinojosa-Ojeda,  Lewis, and Robinson  Ex ante study  using a CGE  11 sectors,  including  W. Hemisphere  Fta  4,190 (-730)  4,190 (-740)  n.a.
(1997)  model of perfect competition  the services  sector.  United  States  920 (-1,080)  920 (-870)  0.00
with differentiated  products,  Capital, land, and 4  Mexico  1,100  (180)  1,100 (-210)  0.23
constant  returns  to  scale,  inter-  types  of labor are  Argentina  630 (140)  630 (-50)  0.13
industry  flows,  and labor  domestically  mobile  Brazil  1,380  (-60)  1,380  (530)  0.12
migration. 1990.  between  sectors.  Chile  160  (90)  160 (-140)  0.14
Unskilled  labor is  Rest of the World  -730  -730  n.a.
mobile  between  Mexico
and U.S.
Notes: Regional integration  of Westem Hemisphere  countries  is represented  by elimination  of all tariff and nontariff barriers between countries in the region
while maintaining  all countries'  previous levels of protection  with the rest of the world. Consumers  differentiate goods and services  by country of origin, and
bilateral import demands  are modeled using the AIDS specification  which allows  import expenditure  elasticities  to differ from one and cross-country  substitution
elasticities to vary for different pairs of countries.  Changes in trade flows  are in millions of U.S. dollars, and changes in welfare are measured  by percentage
changes  in real GDP.  Trade diversion  is substantial  in connection  with imports  by the United States and Chile.117
Table 7.  Policy  Guidelines  Based on Static  Theory  of Regional  Integration  Arrangements
Change  in Economic  Welfare  Ex Ante,
Underlying  Member  Member  Non-member  Ex Post
Static  Theory  Country  Cost  Market  Country  Countries  Quantitative
Policy  Guideline  Framework  Size  Conditions  Structure  (Trade Bloc)  (World)  Support
1. A customs union or free trade area will be trade-  Viner  Small  Constant  Perfect  Positive  N.a.  No Specific
creating  and welfare-improving  for  the trading bloc and  Model  Competition  (Positive)  (Positive)  Quantitative
its  individual  member countries if member countries  Studies
are predominantly  least-cost  producers of exportables.
(Page II)
2. A customs union or free trade area that results in  Viner  N.a.  N.a.  N.a.  Uncertain  N.a.  No Specific
welfare  losses for one or more  member  countries  might  Model I/  (Positive)  (Positive)  Quantitative
still be successfully  implemented  if welfare gains for  Studies
other  member  countries  are sufficiently  large  to fund an
intra-bloc  compensatory  payments  facility. (Page 13)
3. Under increasing  costs conditions,  a customs  union  Viner  Small  Increasing  Perfect  Negative  N.a.  No Specific
or free trade area established among small countries  Model 1/  Competition  (Negative)  (Negative)  Quantitative
unable  to influence  their external  terms of trade will be  Studies
predominantly  trade diverting so long as non-member
countries continue to  supply  imports to  member
countries.  2/ (Page  17)
4. A customs  union or free trade area will be welfare-  Meade  Small  Increasing  Perfect  Positive  Positive  Ex Ante
improving if  the  regional integration arrangement  Model  Competition  (Positive)  (Positive)  Studies
increases member country imports from all  trading
partners,  including  non-member  countries.  3/ (Page  28)
5. Under increasing  cost conditions,  a country  unable  to  Viner  Small  Increasing  Perfect  Case A  Case A  Ex Ante,
affect its international  terms of trade will increase its  Model 1/  Competition  Positive  N.a.  Ex Post
welfare  by  joining  a  "large" regional integration  (Positive)  (Positive)  Studies
arrangement  whose  intra-bloc  relative  prices will not be
affected  by the countrys accession  to the arrangement  Case B  Case B
(Case A).  Conversely, the  country will  reduce its  Negative  N.a.
welfare by  joining  a  "small" regional integration  (Negative)  (Negative)
arrangement  that carmot  supply a  greater volume of
imports to  the  country except at  higher  intra-bloc
prices, in which case welfare of the trading bloc will
also  be reduced  (Case  B). (Page  33)118
Table  7 (Concluded).  Policy  Guidelines  Based on Static  Theory  of Regional  Integration  Arrangements
Change  in Economic  Welfare  Ex Ante,
Underlying  Member  Member  Non-member  Ex Post
Static  Theory  Country  Cost  Market  Country  Countries  Quantitative
Policy  Guideline  Framework  Size  Conditions  Structure  (Trade  Bloc)  (World)  Support
6.  "Natural" trading  partners  forming  a  regional  Viner  Small  Increasing  Perfect  Uncertain  N.a.  No Specific
integration arrangement will not necessarily achieve  Model 1/  Competition  (Uncertain)  (Uncertain)  Quantitative
substantial gains in economic  welfare because tariff  Studies
revenue losses  will be nearly equal if not greater than
welfare gains  from consumption  and production  effects.
(Page  34)
7.  A regional  integration  agreement  formed  by countries  Meade  Small  Increasing  Perfect  Positive  Negative  Ex Ante
facing substantial foreign trade barriers or  transport  Model  Competition  (Positive)  (Uncertain)  Studies
costs  for  their  exports  to  third-countries will  be
welfare-improving  if  the benefits of  "capturing" the
costs of the export  hindrances  outweigh  tariff revenue
losses  and  other  welfare  costs  of  fonning  the
arrangement. (Page  37)
8. Under imperfect  competition  and increasing  returns  Meade  Small,  Decreasing  Imperfect  Positive  Uncertain  Ex Ante
to scale, a regional integration arrangement will be  Model  Large  Competition  (Positive)  (Uncertain)  Studies
welfare-improving in  member  countries  if  pro-
competitive  effects outweigh  tariff revenue losses and
other  possible  welfare costs,  and result in substantially
lower prices for both domestic  and imported  goods 4!
(Page  42)
Source:  Sections  2-to-4  of the paper.
Notes:  Fuller  descriptions  of the policy  guidelines  are provided  in the main text, at the pages  indicated.  N.a. means  not applicable.
1/ Policy  guideline  may  also hold in the Meade model.
2/ The certainty  of welfare  losses occurring  under increasing  cost conditions  is greater, the less highly  protectionist  initially are the countries  forming  the regional  integration
arrangement.
3/ To ensure  that imports  of member  countries  are increased  from all partner countries  under the regional  integration  arrangement,  member countries  should simultaneously
reduce  their barriers  to trade with  non-member  countries.
4/ Whether  the regional  integration  arrangement  will be beneficial  to the world economy  as a whole will depend  on the relative magnitude  of cost reduction  effects  in member
countries  versus  possible  trade suppression  effects  in non-member  countries,  the latter arising from trade diversion  and reduced economies  of scale in production  by firms in non-
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